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First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine
Governmental regulation of commercial advertising has be-
come a major focus of challenges to established first amendment
doctrine.' An increasing number of suits have raised constitutional
objections to regulations of false or deceptive advertising,2 regula-
tions of offensive advertising,3 prohibitions of commercial advertis-
ing in certain forums,' prohibitions of price advertising for particu-
lar products or services, 5 and prohibitions of all advertising for par-
ticular products or services.' Until recently, the majority of courts
upheld such regulations under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Valentine v. Chrestensen that "purely commercial advertising" is
unprotected by the first amendment.'
In the last two years the Court has subjected the Chrestensen
doctrine to intensive scrutiny. In Bigelow v. Virginia,9 decided in
I Commercial advertising, or "commercial speech," cases have recently been prominent
in the Supreme Court's docket. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1976); Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 555
P.2d 640 (Ariz.), prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976). Before 1975, the full Court gave
extended consideration to the constitutional status of commercial advertising in only two
cases, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973),
and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
1 See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976); FTC v. National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2451
(1976).
See, e.g., State v. Cardwell, 539 P.2d 169 (Or. App. 1975).
See, e.g., Howard v. State Dep't of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973) (regulation
of placement of commercial billboards).
I See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96
S. Ct. 1817 (1976) (prescription drug price advertising); Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v.
Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2619
(1976), (advertising prices and places to purchase corrective eyeglasses).
' See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion advertisements); Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (sexually
discriminatory employment proposals).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Id. at 54; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (distinguishing
protected editorial advertisements from "purely commercial" advertisements); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 n.1 (1943);
cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (local government regulation
permitting only commercial advertising on public transit system does not create a "public
forum" for the purpose of political advertising).
1 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
The University of Chicago Law Review
1975, the Court described Chrestensen as "distinctly a limited"
decision 0 and announced that the constitutionality of the regulation
of commercial advertising was to be assessed by "weighing the First
Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged."'"
One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 12 the Court squarely rejected the "sim-
plistic approach" of Chrestensen13 and held that even purely com-
mercial advertising is not "wholly outside the protection of the First
Amendment.' 14
Bigelow and Virginia Board of Pharmacy cast serious doubt on
the constitutionality of the different forms of state action that re-
strict business advertising. However, the Court's rulings may be
difficult for lower courts to apply consistently. Neither Bigelow nor
Virginia Board of Pharmacy defines commercial speech, and only in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy does the Court begin tentatively to
formulate the criteria courts should take into account in balancing
the rights of businesses and consumers against the regulatory inter-
ests of the government. Both a definition and a conception of the
relevant criteria must be developed if lower courts, agencies, and
advertisers are to have adequate guidelines for assessing the consti-
tutionality of advertising regulations.
This comment will examine the constitutional status of com-
mercial advertising before and after Bigelow and Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, and will argue that a distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech remains valid. 5 The comment will then
," Id. at 819. The Court described the decision in Chrestensen as only upholding a
"reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed,"
adding:
The fact that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that
Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial
advertising are immune from constitutional challenge. The case obviously does not
support any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.
Id. at 819-20.
" Id. at 826.
12 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
" Id. at 1824-25.
" Id. at 1825.
This comment is primarily concerned with the status of advertising under the first
amendment. Related issues, such as the first amendment implications of governmental regu-
lation of securities sales and promotion, see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); the first amendment standard
applicable in assessing governmental regulation of speech related to antitrust violations or
unfair trade practices, see, e.g., Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis.
1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974); the first amendment status of business credit
reports, see, e.g., Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1975); or
the first amendment protection of credit reports on private individuals, see, e.g., Millstone
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analyze the difficulties of defining commercial speech and advocate
that courts adopt a definition based on the lower first amendment
value the Supreme Court has found in commercial speech. Finally,
the comment will examine some of the criteria courts should con-
sider in reviewing four illustrative types of regulations of commer-
cial advertising.
I. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND THE IMPACT OF BIGELOW
AND VIRGINIA BOARD OF PHARMACY
A. The "Two-Level" Theory: Commercial Speech as Wholly
Unprotected
The principle that commercial advertising is unprotected by
the first amendment was first enunciated in Valentine v.
Chrestensen,'5 where the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance pro-
hibiting the distribution of handbills containing "commercial and
business advertising matter."" One side of Chrestensen's handbill
advertised a commercial display of a submarine. The reverse side
contained a protest against the action of New York City officials
denying the submarine wharfage facilities. In an opinion later char-
acterized as "casual, almost offhand,"' 8 the Court noted that the
first amendment protects leafleting for the purpose of communicat-
ing information and disseminating opinion on issues of public im-
portance," but held that "[w]e are equally clear that the Constitu-
tion imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising.""0 The Court dismissed the presence of the
protest against the city officials, finding that it had been added to
the handbill "with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the
prohibition of the ordinance." 2'
This ruling was consistent with previous Supreme Court deci-
v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976), are considered only incidentally. Most
factors relevant to the first amendment status of business advertising, however, also apply
in these other contexts.
" 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a fuller treatment of the background of the commercial speech
doctrine, see Devore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 745, 747-64 (1975); Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 448-72 (1971).
,1 316 U.S. at 53. In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Court had ruled that
local ordinances forbidding all forms of leafleting were unconstitutional. The New York City
ordinance at issue in Chrestensen had been amended to apply only to "commercial and
business advertising matter" in 1938.
" Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
, 316 U.S. at 54.
2Id.
1, Id. at 55.
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sions concerning advertising regulations, 2  and subsequent opinions
were similarly unconcerned with the first amendment implications
of advertising restrictions.2 3 These cases treated business advertis-
ing as merely a form of economic activity subject to government
regulation within the less stringent limits of due process. 2
Chrestensen's significance lay in making explicit the assumed ir-
relevance of the first amendment and in suggesting the "primary
purpose" definition of unprotected commercial speech.2 Under this
approach, if a communication is primarily intended to generate
business profits, it can be regulated as a form of economic activity
and enjoys no first amendment protection; but if the primary pur-
pose is to convey information or views on public issues, the commu-
nication is accorded the full protection of the first amendment. 28 So
formulated, the Chrestensen doctrine constitutes a branch of the
"two-level" theory of the first amendment,7 which classifies speech
22 See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (prohi-
bition of advertising by dentists); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (prohibition of
cigarette advertising on billboards).
3 See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963)
(prohibition of optical advertising); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(same); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (prohibition of vehicular
advertising unrelated to owner's business). These cases upheld advertising regulations under
a standard requiring only a "rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil
to be curbed." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). When first amendment rights
are recognized to exist, the Court accords them a "preferred position," id., and requires a
demonstration of an "important," "significant," or "compelling" governmental interest to
justify infringements. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963).
21 The Court's attitude in these decisions is aptly captured by a remark in Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 949 n.93 (1963): "Com-
munications in connection with commercial transactions generally relate to a separate sector
of social activity involving the system of property rights rather than free expression."
11 Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942), with Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
2' See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 429, 451-58 (1971); Developments in the
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1028 (1967); 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1258,
1262 (1974).
The term "full protection" as used in this comment refers to the degree of protection that
would be accorded to noncommercial speech in any particular regulatory context. For exam-
ple, when fully protected speech is subject to a prior restraint, the government "carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2802 (1976). When fully protected speech constitutes advocacy
of unlawful conduct it can be punished only if the advocacy "is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv.
20, 33 (1975). The term "two-level theory" was coined by Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. See H.
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as either fully protected or wholly unprotected."
The primary purpose definition of unprotected commercial
speech was eventually rejected as the Court recognized that the
motives or objectives of the speaker bear no necessary relationship
to the value of his expression.29 The test was formally denounced in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3" the landmark decision creating
a conditional first amendment defense against defamation actions
by public officials. The libel alleged in the suit had appeared in a
newspaper advertisement soliciting funds for the civil rights move-
ment. The Court, noting that the profit motive of an author or
newspaper publisher has no first amendment significance,31 found
it immaterial that the Times had been paid to print the advertise-
ment. In place of the primary purpose definition, the Court an-
nounced a new variant of the two-level theory. Chrestensen was
distinguished on the ground that "[t]he publication here was not
a 'commercial advertisement"' but instead "communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a move-
ment whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest pub-
lic interest and concern. '32 By drawing a line between "purely com-
mercial" and "editorial" advertising,33 the Court keyed the defini-
KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 45-46 (1966); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10-12.
" The classic statement is in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity has no "socially redeeming value");
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libel is unprotected speech). The Court continues
to refer to narrow classes of unprotected speech in its opinions. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975) (listing fighting words, obscenity, libel, and incitement). For a
discussion of the role of categorization in first amendment analysis, see Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis,
88 HAav. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
21 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); see Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" Id. at 266, citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959), where the Court had
noted that "[i]t is of course no matter" that the dissemination of books and other forms of
literature "takes place under commercial auspices."
:' 376 U.S. at 266.
The Court noted that "any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carry-
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tion of commerical speech to the content of the speech rather than
the purpose of the advertiser; speech containing information and
opinion on matters of "highest public interest and concern" is fully
protected, even when it appears in the form of paid advertising. The
Court left unquestioned, however, Chrestensen's basic tenet that
"purely commercial advertising" is wholly unprotected by the first
amendment. 4
B. The Pittsburgh Press Decision: An Intimation of Some
Protection for Commercial Speech
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,3" the Supreme Court reexamined the constitutional sta-
tus of commercial advertising. Construing a local ordinance that
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sex,36 the
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations ruled that it was dis-
criminatory for employers to publish job advertisements under
newspaper columns designated by sex.17 The Commission found
that the Pittsburgh Press had violated a separate aider and abettor
section of the ordinance by agreeing to print employment want ads
under such columns, and enjoined the newspaper's use of columns
classified by sex. On appeal, the injunction was affirmed, 8 but nar-
rowed to allow the publication of advertisements under sex-
ing 'editorial advertisements' of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the
promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to
publishing facilities .... " Id.
31 See 23 DEPAUL L. Rav. 1258, 1267 (1974).
" 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
, Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 75 (Feb. 28, 1967), as amended, Ordinance 395 (July 7,
1969). As excerpted by the Court, the relevant provisions of the ordinance made it an unlawful
employment practice
(a) For any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise discriminate against any
person with respect to hiring. . . because of. . .sex ...
(e) For any "employer," employment agency or labor organization to publish or
circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement relating
to "employment" or membership which indicates any discrimination because of.
sex.
(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor organiza-
tion, to aid. . . in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice
by this ordinance. ...
Id. at 378.
11 Petition for Certiorari at la-18a, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
" Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct.
448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
[44:205
Protection for Commercial Advertising
designated columns for positions exempt from the ordinance.39 A
divided Supreme Court 0 affirmed.
Justice Powell's majority opinion addressed two issues central
to the commercial speech doctrine: whether the newspaper's publi-
cation of want ads under particular column headings was commer-
cial speech, and if it was, how it should be treated under the first
amendment.4' The Court first established that the want ads were
themselves commercial speech.42 The majority reaffirmed that the
content of speech rather than the advertiser's profit motive is deter-
minative of whether speech is commercial. 3 Comparing the content
of the want ads with the handbill in Chrestensen and the editorial
advertisement in New York Times, the Court concluded that the
want ads were closer to the handbill . 4 "The critical feature of the
advertisement in Valentine v. Chrestensen was that, in the Court's
view, it did no more than propose a commercial transaction, the sale
of admission to a submarine." 5 Since the want ads were "no more
than a proposal of possible employment," they were "classic exam-
ples of commercial speech." 6
The Court's characterization of commercial speech as speech
that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" was
probably intended not as an exclusive definition but only as a
description of a prototypical form.4" The Pittsburgh Press had not
31 Id. at 470, 287 A.2d at 172.
" Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall
and Rehnquist; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Blackmun each filed
dissents.
" The Court also had to resolve contentions that the advertising restriction unconstitu-
tionally impaired the newpaper's institutional viability by depriving it of a source of revenue,
413 U.S. at 382-83, and that the injunction was an impermissible prior restraint. Id. at 389-
90. The majority rejected the first argument since the record here, unlike that in Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (where the Court invalidated a law taxing the
advertising revenue of newspapers with circulations over 20,000), failed to show "any purpose
of muzzling or curbing the press" or any significant financial consequences to the newspaper.
413 U.S.at 383. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 934 (1972). See also De Vore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 745, 772-74 (1975). The second contention was rejected because the order
was "based on a continuous course of repetitive conduct," was clear, and did not sweep more
broadly than necessary, 413 U.S. at 390.
12 413 U.S. at 384-85.




1 In subsequent commercial speech decisions, the Court has adopted this characteriza-
tion as the paradigm case of commecial speech. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1826, 1830 n.24 (1976); Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975).
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proposed a commercial transaction, but had published the employ-
ment proposals of other businesses for a fee. The newspaper con-
tended that since it had only exercised its editorial judgment in
accepting and arranging the want ads, it had not engaged in com-
mercial speech. With little discussion or apparent difficulty, the
Court concluded that the media may be engaging in commercial
speech when they accept advertisements that do no more than pro-
pose a transaction." Here the offending speech involved the ar-
rangement of facially neutral want ads, rather than the acceptance
of discriminatory advertisements.49 Nevertheless, Justice Powell
found that the close relationship between the information in the
column headings and the proposals of employment made the col-
umn designations and want ads "an integrated commercial state-
ment" conveying "essentially the same message as an overtly dis-
criminatory want ad. '5 The newspaper's editorial judgment in pro-
viding column headings, as well as its decision to accept the adver-
tisements, was expression within the category of commercial speech.
The Court's decision leaves the definition of commercial speech
unclear. The prototypical case is speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction; but the distribution of such
speech by the media, and in some circumstances, the distribution
of commercial proposals under particular editorial formats, will be
considered commercial speech as well.51
' The Court relied in particular on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
which it read as establishing that a newspaper publishing a falsely defamatory advertisement
with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity could be punished for libel. The Court
also noted that in Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972), cigarette commercials were treated as commercial speech even though
the first amendment attack on the proscription of television and radio cigarette advertising
had been brought by broadcasters rather than cigarette manufacturers. 413 U.S. at 386; see
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). But cf.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828 (1975) (application of advertising prohibition to pub-
lisher and editor of newspaper rather than advertiser "incurred more serious First Amend-
ment overtones").
" Since no preferences for men or women applicants were indicated in the employment
want ads themselves, only their placement under sex-designated column headings made them
even implicitly discriminatory. See 413 U.S. at 387-88.
10 Id. at 388.
" The dissenters were disturbed by what they perceived as an expansion of the commer-
cial speech doctrine, fearing that the majority's authorization of governmental control over
the newspaper's advertising layout might portend approval of governmental interference with
other aspects of a newspaper's composition. Id. at 393 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 403
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAv. L. REV. 55, 157 (1973).
The majority emphatically denied this interpretation, stating that nothing in the Court's
decision would "authorize any restriction. . . on stories or commentary originated by Pitts-
burgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors." Justice Powell unequivocally reaffirmed "the
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Having determined that the Pittsburgh Press had engaged in
commercial speech, the Court addressed the first amendment status
of commercial speech in response to the newspaper's argument that
the Chrestensen doctrine that commercial speech is wholly unpro-
tected should be overruled. 52 Justice Powell's guarded answer was
that "[wihatever the merits of this contention may be in other
contexts," it could not be accepted in a case in which the advertised
commercial activity was illegal. 3 The Court suggested that regula-
tions of advertising for legitimate commercial activity should be
assessed by balancing "[a]ny First Amendment interest which
might be served by an ordinary commercial proposal" against "the
governmental interest supporting the regulation." 4 Although this
statement is dictum and somewhat cryptic, it clearly implies a
rejection of the view that commercial speech is per se unprotected.
In place of the simplistic two-level theory, the Court suggested a
more sophisticated approach: first, a court should determine
whether a particular advertisement is within the definition of com-
mercial speech;5 and second, if it is commercial speech, the court
should assess whether the governmental interest behind the regula-
tion outweighs the first amendment value of the speech. For the first
time the Court implied that speech that does "no more than propose
a commercial transaction" is not wholly unprotected by the first
amendment.
C. The Impact of Bigelow and Virginia Board of Pharmacy: The
Demise of the Two-Level Theory
Two years after Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court recon-
sidered the constitutional status of commercial advertising. In
protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of views on these and
other issues, however controversial." 413 U.S. at 391.
The dissenters were also disturbed because the newspaper's column headings were far
removed from speech that could be characterized as criminal incitement. See id. at 395 n.2
(Burger, J., dissenting) (case does not present "a blatant involvement by a newspaper in a
criminal transaction"); id. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (speech here not "closely bri-
gaded" with prohibited action); 48 TuL. L. REV. 426, 429 & n.14 (1974).
52 413 U.S. at 388.
53 Id.
11 The Court's full statement was: "Any First Amendment interest which might be
served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh
the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial
activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation
on economic activity." Id. at 389.
1 413 U.S. at 382.
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Bigelow v. Virginia,6 the Court overturned the conviction of a Vir-
ginia newspaper editor who had violated a Virginia statute57 by
publishing an advertisement for an abortion referral agency in New
York. The Court's decision drew on a number of factors, none of
which appears determinative. Although the advertisement had been
published before the Court recognized a constitutional right to abor-
tion,5" the ad's message took on added significance since it "per-
tained to constitutional interests."59 The advertisement not only
proposed a commercial transaction, but also contained "factual
material of clear 'public interest' "6 -a factor that apparently gave
the ad greater first amendment value in the eyes of the Court. The
Court also emphasized that the advertising Virginia sought to sup-
press was for a service provided in New York, noting that Virginia's
police powers could not control abortions performed in New York,'
that Virginia could not prevent its citizens from traveling to New
York to obtain an abortion,6 2 and that Virginia's regulation would
56 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court divided 7 to 2, with Justices Rehnquist and White
dissenting.
11 "If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of
any publication, or in any manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscar-
riage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1960).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Court
initially vacated and remanded Bigelow's conviction for further consideration in light of the
abortion cases. 413 U.S. at 909. On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed the
judgment, Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 342, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). The Court
took the case again and agreed with the state that "'this is a First Amendment case' and
'not an abortion case.'" Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815 n.5 (1975).
1' 421 U.S. at 822.
" Id.
421 U.S. at 823, 824, 827, 828. At one point the Court seemed to announce a per se
rule prohibiting the regulation of advertising for out-of-state commercial activity, at least
when that activity is legal; id. at 824-25; see id. at 835-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Such a
ruling would conflict with prior decisions, see, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners
in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (New Mexico newspaper and radio station enjoined from
publishing advertisements for Texas optometrist in violation of New Mexico law); Delamater
v. South Dakota, 205 U.S. 93, 104 (1907) (upholding "the authority of the States to forbid
agents of non-resident liquor dealers from coming within their borders to solicit contracts for
the purchase of intoxicating liquors which otherwise the citizen of the State 'would not have
thought of making' "). There is no indication the Court intended to overrule these cases. See
421 U.S. at 825 n.10 (preserving the result in Head).
The majority's minimization of Virginia's interests in regulating advertising for out-of-
state transactions is more appropriate for personal services performed out-of-state, such as
abortions, than for sales of products that could be purchased out-of-state and brought into
Virginia in violation of Virginia law. For example, if Virginia prohibited the possession of
handguns, and Virginia newspapers carried advertisements for the lawful sale of handguns
in New York, a court might reasonably find that the advertisements sufficiently threatened
the enforcement of Virginia's law to warrant their suppression.
62 421 U.S. at 824, 827; see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966).
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burden interstate commerce in periodicals or newspapers carrying
such advertisements .3 Pittsburgh Press did not legitimize the regu-
lation, since the abortion service advertised, unlike employment
discrimination, was legal in New York at the time the ad was pub-
lished. 4 The Court applied a standard requiring the government to
demonstrate that the legitimate public interests in regulation out-
weigh the value of the speech. 5
Although the state asserted interests in shielding women from
"commercial pressure" to obtain an abortion" and in protecting
women in Virginia from unscrupulous practitioners in New York,"
the Court struck down the advertising regulation as applied to Bige-
low. The connection between abortions performed in New York and
Virginia's internal police powers was too tenuous to justify the pro-
hibition. However, Justice Blackmun was careful to reserve
determination of "the precise extent to which the First Amendment
permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the
State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit."69
Less than one year later, the Court had an opportunity to rule
on the constitutional status of advertising for a type of activity
within the state's police powers. In Virginia State Board of Phar-
'1 421 U.S. at 828-29. The Court noted that similiar abortion referral advertisements had
appeared in Redbook magazine, a national publication. Id. at 814.
" Id. at 821, 822-23.
" 421 U.S. at 826; see text and notes at notes 172-73 infra.
See Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 196, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1972):
It is clearly within the police power of the state to enact reasonable measures to ensure
that pregnant women in Virginia who decide to have abortions come to their decisions
without the commercial advertising pressure usually incidental to the sale of a box of
soap powder.
'7 Id.
" 421 U.S. at 827-28. The actual grounds for the decision are difficult to determine
because the Court did not clearly distinguish between such factors as the limits of Virginia's
police power, the legality of the transaction, the impediment to the right to travel, and the
possible burden on interstate commerce. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 47, 118 n.51 (1975).
" 421 U.S. at 825; see id. at 826. The Court also indicated that the Virginia courts should
have initially permitted the appellant to raise an overbreadth challenge to the statute, id. at
815-17, since" 'pure speech' rather than conduct was involved," see Broaderick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973), and because noncommercial speech such as encouragement of
abortions by doctors, husbands, and lecturers seemed to be within the terms of the statute.
See note 57 supra. Since the statute was amended after Bigelow's conviction to prohibit only
advertisements for illegal abortions performed in Virginia, VA. CODE §§ 18.1-62.1, .3 (Supp.
1975), the Court found the overbreadth issue moot "as a practical matter" since the statute's
pre-1972 form would not be applied again. 421 U.S. at 817-18. However, even in its amended
form the statute was not limited to commercial solicitation of abortions. It therefore remained
overbroad and continued to impose a chilling effect on the petitioner that should have been
sufficient to allow an overbreadth challenge. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 848 (1970).
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macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,70 the Court invalida-
ted a statute subjecting licensed pharmacists to penalties for "un-
professional conduct" if they advertised the prices of prescription
drugs.7 The Court did not attempt to differentiate drug price adver-
tisements from speech that does "no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction, ' 72 but found that the advertisements were "of
value"73 to consumers. Advertised drug prices would aid indigent or
elderly consumers who might not have the means for comparison
shopping, 4 and would benefit society as a whole by facilitating the
efficient allocation of resources75 and providing factual information
70 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). Seven Justices joined the majority; Justice Rehnquist dissented
and Justice Stevens did not take part.
71 VA. CODE. § 54-524.35 (1974). The statute provided that a licensed pharmacist is guilty
of unprofessional conduct if he "(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly,
in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms
. . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription." Penalties consisted of a
fine or revocation or suspension of the pharmacist's license. VA. CODE § 54-524.22:1 (1974).
The constitutionality of the statute had previously been upheld against a first amend-
ment, due process, and equal protection challenge brought by licensed pharmacists. Patter-
son Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969). In Virginia Board of Pharmacy,
the statute was attacked by consumers; the Court found that the consumers had standing
to challenge the statute because of their first amendment right to receive drug price infor-
mation. 96 S. Ct. 1823; see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also Comment, The Right to Receive and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J. 775 (1975).
72 96 S. Ct. at 1826, 1830 n. 24 (1976).
11 Id. at 1821.
11 The Court observed that "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of com-
mercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate." Id. at 1826. The Court also noted that the advertiser's "purely
economic" interest did not disqualify him from first amendment protection, citing first
amendment-labor relations cases for support. Id. at 1826, citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); AFL v. Swing,
312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
15 Id. at 1827; see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-05 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Court's ruling that the microeconomic functions
performed by commercial speech constitute interests protected by the first amendment is a
novel addition to the list of interests traditionally thought to have first amendment protec-
tion. See.text and notes at notes 121-30 infra. Justice Rehnquist, in disspnt, found "nothing
in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the
teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession." 96
S. Ct. at 1836. This observation evokes Justice Holmes's dissent in Lockner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75 (1905) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics"), and suggests that the Court's recognition of resource allocation as a constitutionally
protected interest, at least when "speech" is involved, portends a partial return to Lockner's
substantive due process review of business regulation. However, the Court's decision to accord
a measure of first amendment protection to commercial speech can be justified on traditional
first amendment grounds, see, e.g., Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Com-
mercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 429 (1971); text
and notes at notes 120-70 infra, an approach that avoids the substantive due process overtones
of the majority opinion.
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relevant to public discussion of controversial economic questions.7 1
Balancing the first amendment interests of pharmacists, consum-
ers, and society against the justifications advanced for the stat-
ute-preventing ruinous price competition that would endanger the
quality of pharmaceutical services 77 and protecting the professional
image of pharmacists7 -the Court held that the regulation violated
the first amendment.79 For the first time, the Court expressly ruled
that a purely commercial advertisement enjoys some first amend-
ment protection."
Neither Bigelow nor Virginia Board of Pharmacy represents
significant progress beyond Pittsburgh Press in defining commercial
speech. Part of the explanation for this shortcoming may be that
Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinions in Bigelow and
Virginia Board of Pharmacy, was anxious to destroy any vestiges of
the two-level theory of commercial speech."' Both opinions contain
71 96 S. Ct. at 1826; id. at 1835 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court cited three cases
involving commercial advertising containing information of general public interest: Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme &
Son, 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (advertising campaign by manufacturers of synthetic
furs implicitly accusing the fur industry of endangering species of fur-bearing animals), aff'd,
501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) (union attempt to compel newspaper to accept
advertisement opposing importation of foreign-made clothing), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973
(1971).
77 96 S. Ct. at 1828-29. The state's argument was that limiting aggressive price competi-
tion would enable pharmacists to provide expensive services of compounding, handling, and
dispensing prescription drugs, which might be neglected if price competition led to cost-
cutting measures. The Court found little merit in the argument, noting that "nothing pre-
vents the 'professional' pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior product, and
contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer." Id. at 1829.
The Court also implied that the state could directly regulate "cut-throat" competition under
the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
7, 96 S. Ct. at 1829.
71 96 S. Ct. at 1828-29. The Court observed that one social interest commonly advanced
in support of prohibition of advertising for specific goods and products-the reduction of
public demand for potentially harmful or dangerous products-was unavailable to the state
in this case since the pharmaceuticals involved could be obtained only with a physician's
prescription. Id. at 1828 n.21. But see id. at 1829 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also
Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal.
1976), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976).
[Tihe question whether there is a First Amendment exception for "commercial
speech" is squarely before us. Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any
subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particularly
newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters.
The "idea" he wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription
drug at the Y price."
96 S. Ct. at 1825. The Court ruled that such expression does not lack "all protection." Id. at
1826.
" This purpose is clearly evidenced in the following key passage:
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language broadly condemning the idea that advertising can be
divided into distinct categories of commercial and noncommercial
speech.8 2 And the majority opinion in Virginia Board of Pharmacy
evidences outright revisionism in asserting that Pittsburgh Press
was based not on a distinction between commercial and other types
of speech, but only on the illegality of the discriminatory employ-
ment proposals in the advertisements and the newspaper layout.3
These passages leave the impression that the Court is moving away
from the premise that commercial speech is a special category with
a unique status in constitutional law.
Yet the Court did not carry through its efforts to undermine a
distinct category of commercial speech. In the concluding para-
graphs of both Bigelow84 and Virginia Board of Pharmacy,5 the
majority recognized that in certain contexts, such as regulation of
false or deceptive advertising, cogent reasons exist for distinguishing
between commercial advertising and other speech. The Court ex-
pressly indicated that in these contexts, commercial speech would
continue to receive less than full protection.8 6
The Court was working at cross-purposes in emphasizing the
difficulties of defining commercial speech yet requiring that in cer-
tain contexts courts continue to observe the distinction. These con-
flicting thrusts underlie some of the confusion in the opinions, par-
ticularly in Bigelow. 7 In determining whether the offending adver-
Our question is whether speech which does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction," Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S., at 385, . . . is so removed from any "exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, . . (1942), and from" 'truth, science, morality, and the
arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Govern-
ment.'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, .. (1957), that it lacks all protec-
tion. Our answer is that it is not.
Id. at 1826. Chaplinsky and Roth are leading cases adopting the two-level theory. See note
28 supra. The effect of divorcing the Pittsburgh Press characterization of commercial speech
from the rulings in these cases is to disassociate the commercial speech doctrine from the two-
level theory.
" See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct.
1817, 1827 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
" 96 S. Ct. at 1824.
" 421 U.S. at 828. The Court suggested that the regulation might have been upheld if
the advertisement had been deceptive or fraudulent, had "related to a commodity or service
that was then illegal," or had "otherwise furthered a criminal scheme." Id. The Court also
suggested that commercial advertising can be regulated to protect citizens' privacy rights or
to shield a captive audience. Id.
96 S. Ct. at 1830-31; see text at notes 101-02 infra.
56 96 S. Ct. at 1830 n.24.
S7 The lower courts divided after Bigelow as to whether the Court's emphasis on the
public interest element of the advertisement signified that a narrow category of commercial
speech remained per se unprotected. For cases interpreting Bigelow as having abolished a
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tisement 88 in that case was commercial speech, the Court followed
the method used in Pittsburgh Press," comparing the advertisement
with the "commercial" advertisements in Chrestensen and
Pittsburgh Press and the "editorial" advertisement in New York
Times. The analysis revealed "important differences between the
advertisement presently at issue and those involved in Chrestensen
and Pittsburgh Press. ""
The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It
contained factual material of clear "public interest." Portions
of its message, most prominently the lines, "Abortions are now
legal in New York. There are no residency requirements," in-
volve the exercise of the freedom of communicating informa-
tion and disseminating opinion."
distinct category of unprotected commercial speech, see Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v.
Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (C.D. Cal.), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2619
(1976); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Washington State Dep't of Agriculture, 402 F. Supp. 1253,
1256-57 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 557
(E.D. Pa. 1975). For opinions reading Bigelow as preserving a narrow category of unprotected
purely commercial speech, see Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Department of Consumer
Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075, 1082 (C.D. Cal.), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976) (dissenting
opinion); Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, 638 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1975);
Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob. juris. noted,
96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976); Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 38 N.Y.2d 364, 369-70, 342 N.E.2d 583,
586, 379 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819-20 (1975).
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court acknowledged the ambiguity left by Bigelow
in noting that "some fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a 'commercial speech'
exception arguably might have persisted because of the subject matter of the advertisement
in Bigelow." 96 S. Ct. at 1825. The Court decisively resolved the ambiguity by stating that
speech will no longer be held unprotected simply because it is "commercial." Id. at 1825-27.
0 The advertisement consisted of particular information about a New York abortion
referral agency, and general information about the availability of legal abortions in New York:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements,
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED




New York, N.Y. 10022
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make all arrangements for you
and help you with information and counseling.
421 U.S. at 812 (1975).
" See text at notes 44-46 supra.
421 U.S. at 821-22.
,, Id. at 822. The phrase "public interest" refers to the Court's characterization of the
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If the Court was equating the advertisement in Bigelow with the
advertisement in New York Times, and thereby placing it outside
the category of commercial speech, the remainder of the opinion is
inexplicable. The advertisement in New York Times was "entitled
to the same degree of constitutional protection as ordinary
speech. 92 The advertisement in Bigelow, however, was hardly
treated as "ordinary speech." If the speech promoting the abortion
agency had been fully protected, Virginia's justification for punish-
ing it would have been subject to strict scrutiny 3 under the test of
Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 which measures the legitimacy of speech
inciting unlawful activities. But the Court found Brandenburg inap-
posite95 and applied a balancing test requiring only that the govern-
mental interest "outweigh" the value of the advertising. By apply-
ing this test, the Court gave the advertisement the same amount of
protection that Pittsburgh Press suggested commercial speech was
due. 7
It is more satisfactory to read the passage distinguishing the
advertisement in Bigelow from those in Chrestensen and Pittsburgh
advertisement in New York Times as concerning matters "of the highest public interest and
concern." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), quoted in Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975). Justice Blackmun also noted that Bigelow's advertisement
"conveyed information of potential interest and value" to those with a general curiosity about
abortion and its legal status and to those seeking reform in Virginia. The advertisement was
therefore "not unnewsworthy." Id.
This passage created the impression that the Court was adopting a "public interest" test
for distinguishing protected from unprotected advertising. See cases cited in note 87 supra;
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 Hmv. L. REV. 47, 116-18 (1975); 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640,
646-48 (1976); 42 TENN. L. REV. 573, 579-81 (1975). Under this reading of Bigelow, the decision
creates a remarkable "three-level" theory of commercial speech: unprotected purely commer-
cial speech; commercial speech of "public interest" granted some protection; and editorial
advertisements having full first amendment protection. Cf. Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson,
398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob. juris noted, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976) (dividing
advertisements into "purely commercial," "mixed," and "editorial"). Even if this interpreta-
tion is correct, Virginia Board of Pharmacy ended the three-level theory by establishing that
purely commercial advertising also enjoys some protection. See text and note at note 80
supra.
,2 421 U.S. at 820 (1975); see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
,3 See note 23 supra.
,4 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see note 197 infra. In Holiday Magic Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp.
20, 24 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974), the applica-
tion of the Brandenburg test in the commercial speech context was specifically rejected. For
an unusual case applying a clear and present danger analysis to a commercial advertising
prohibition, see Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738, 742
(E.D. Mich. 1972). The decision is criticized for ignoring Chrestensen and subsequent com-
mercial speech cases in 51 N.C.L. REV. 581 (1973).
'5 421 U.S. at 819.
"Id. at 826.
'7 See text and notes at notes 52-55 supra.
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Press as suggesting that the "public interest" value of commercial
advertising be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Under this ap-
proach, a generalized judgment about the nature and value of com-
mercial advertising might seem unnecessary. 8 However, as long as
the Court does not question the holding of New York Times that
editorial advertisements are entitled to full protection without a
case-by-case assessment of their "public interest" value, a threshold
distinction between commercial and editorial advertising is re-
quired to determine when a case-by-case approach should be ap-
plied.
The pattern of denying and then reaffirming the existence of a
commercial speech category is also apparent in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy. In discussing the first amendment value of advertising
the retail prices of prescription drugs, the Court returned to the
theme of Bigelow in stressing that commercial advertising may con-
tain not only purely economic information but also information of
general public interest.9 The suggested consequence was that "no
line between publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial adver-
tising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn."100 Despite this
difficulty, the Court recognized, as it had in Bigelow, that there are
areas where regulation of commercial advertising is "surely permis-
sible,"'0 ' giving as examples time, place, and manner restrictions on
the distribution of commercial speech, regulations of false or decep-
tive advertising, and regulations of advertising for illegal transac-
tions.0 In a footnote the Court made explicit the continuing viabil-
ity of a commercial speech distinction in these contexts.
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable
from other forms. There are commonsense differences between
speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion," Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. at 385 . . . , and other varieties. Even if
the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial
speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression
by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree
'" This interpretation is reinforced by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1827 (1976) (noting that the degree of public
interest content in advertising varies widely).
, See note 76 supra.
'" 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
,A, Id. at 1830.
12 Id. at 1830-31.
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of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired."°3
Bigelow and Virginia Board of Pharmacy essentially vindicate
the position suggested by Justice Powell in dictum in Pittsburgh
Press: there is a distinct category of commercial speech that enjoys
some, but not full, first amendment protection. 4 Neither case, how-
ever, gives a working definition of commercial speech. The difficult
problem of determining the elements that define commercial
speech, left open by Pittsburgh Press, remains.
I1. THE DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH AFTER VIRGINIA BOARD OF
PHARMACY
A. The Supreme Court's Rationale for Allowing Greater
Regulation of Commercial Speech
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court was anxious
to ensure that its decision would not be read as questioning the
constitutionality of regulations of false and deceptive advertising.105
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion develops a first amendment
justification for regulating deceptive advertising more rigorously
than deceptive speech outside the commercial context,' 0 and Jus-
tice Blackmun's majority opinion contains a similar but less exten-
sive justification.' 7 Together, these opinions offer a tentative ration-
ale for according reduced first amendment protection to commercial
advertising and provide an appropriate place to begin an effort to
define commercial speech.' 8
Justices Stewart and Blackmun suggest five factors that distin-
guish commercial speech and justify regulating it more rigorously
than other varieties of speech.
(1) The advertiser of commercial commodities and services
has better access to the facts concerning his product than the
media have to the facts in their news reports, which may be
drawn from sketchy or conflicting sources.'00
,o3 Id. at 1830 n.24.
,o See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975) (quoting with approval the dictum
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973)).
,13 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct.
1817, 1830-31 (1976).
106 Id. at 1832-35.
'o' Id. at 1830-31 & n.24.
104 Although Justices Blackmun and Stewart emphasized different criteria, their ap-
proaches are not contradictory, and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence made no objection to
any of the factors mentioned. See id. at 1831-32.
,0I Id.at 1830 n.24 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 1833 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[44:205
Protection for Commercial Advertising
(2) The factual assertions in commercial advertising relate to
tangible goods and services that are more susceptible to empiri-
cal testing by regulatory authorities than are representations
made in news reports and editorials:"10
(3) The importance of advertising in generating profits makes
it less susceptible to the chilling effect of governmental regula-
tion than news reporting and editorializing.'
(4) The advertiser of commercial commodities and services
does not have to assemble the facts about his product under
time pressure as do media distributors with publication dead-
lines for topical material. 1 2
(5) Commercial speech has lower first amendment value than
reports of news and expressions of opinion since commercial
advertising generally makes no express contribution to the
forum of ideas."'
An examination of these distinguishing characteristics reveals
serious drawbacks in using most of them as a foundation for defining
commercial speech. First, although regulations of commercial ad-
vertising often apply not only to business advertisers but also to the
media distributing such advertisements,I" some of the factors listed
by the Court are irrelevant to regulations directed against the media
as distributors of advertising. The media have less access than busi-
ness advertisers to the facts about commercial products and services
(factor 1) and thus may not have the opportunity to objectively
resolve factual questions about commercial products and services
(factor 2). In general, newspapers and broadcasters have less access
to information about products and services appearing in commercial
advertisements they disseminate than they do to facts in the news
stories their reporters have investigated.
In addition, the media's financial interest in commercial adver-
I" Id. at 1835 (Stewart, J., concurring); See Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1030-31 (1967).
I" Id. at 1830 n.24 (Blackmun, J.).
"' Id. at 1833 (Stewart, J., concurring).
,, Id. at 1834-35 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 1827 & n.19 (by implication).
,, This was the case in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), and Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). In contexts such as
prohibitions of advertising for particular harmful or illegal products, the media must be
included in the regulatory scheme in order to police it effectively. Regulating advertisers alone
is inadequate because an advertiser might not remain in the jurisdiction of the regulating
government long enough to be subject to service of process, and because advertisers might
be so numerous that enforcement would be impossible unless the media were also subject to
regulation. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973).
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tising (factor 3)-earning revenue through the sale of advertis-
ing"-is likely to be insignificant for any particular advertisement
or line of advertising in comparison with the financial interest of the
advertiser. A business advertiser may have such an important and
enduring financial interest in promotional advertising that the
expense and delay in overcoming regulatory obstacles to his adver-
tisements will not deter him from taking all available measures to
secure his rights. In contrast, the media are unlikely to have a suffi-
cient financial interest in any particular advertisement to overcome
the chilling effect of such regulation.' 6
A second difficulty with using the Court's factors as a basis for
defining commercial speech is that several of them are factual gen-
eralizations that do not hold true in specific cases. The financial
incentives of a business to secure its right to advertise (factor 3) will
vary with the financial returns expected from particular advertising
programs. A gasoline service station operator hardly has the incen-
tive to challenge governmental action against a deceptive advertise-
ment that a large oil corporation has to challenge action affecting a
national advertising campaign. Moreover, it is not always true that
business advertisers face less severe publication deadlines than the
news media (factor 4), since market conditions, and therefore adver-
tising copy, can change quite rapidly in some industries, such as
grocery retailing. The assertion that factual questions about com-
mercial commodities and services can be objectively resolved by
empirical testing (factor 2) is also suspect, as the frequent disputes
over the qualities of products in Food and Drug Administration
proceedings demonstrate. 17
Factors 1 through 4 of the Supreme Court's rationale for the
permissible regulation of false and deceptive commercial speech are
more relevant to the reasonableness of regulations than to a prelimi-
"I Some courts have characterized the media's interest in advertising as purely financial,
as opposed to the advertiser who also has an interest in conveying a certain message. See
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972);
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972); cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city that limited
access to advertising space on buses to commercial speech was acting in a "proprietary"
capacity). See also De Vore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 745 (1975).
"I On occasion the media's financial interest in a particular type of advertising has been
sufficiently strong to induce a challenge to its prohibition. See, e.g., New York State Broad-
casters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970)
(state lottery advertising); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C.
1971), afl'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (cigarette commercials).
"I A recent example is the controversy surrounding the FDA's decision to ban the use of
food coloring Red No. 2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1976, § 1, at 20, col. 1.
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nary definition of commercial speech. These factors represent the
kind of contextual considerations courts should weigh in the balanc-
ing test set forth in Bigelow' 5 and Virginia Board of Pharmacy."9
The factors should not be incorporated in the threshold question
whether it is appropriate to apply a balancing test rather than the
strict scrutiny standard employed in assessing regulation of fully
protected speech. Factor 5 of the Court's rationale-the reduced
first amendment value of commercial advertising-is a more prom-
ising basis for deriving a definition of commercial speech.
B. A Definition Derived from the Lower Value of Commercial
Speech
In suggesting that the lower value of commercial advertising
allows more rigorous regulation of commercial speech than other
varieties of speech,'20 the Court posited an inverse relationship be-
tween the value of speech and the permissible degree of
regulation.1 2' The idea that different types of expression have differ-
ent degrees of first amendment value is fundamental to the Su-
preme Court's explication of the first amendment. The Court has
declared that the central purpose of the first amendment is to pro-
tect political expression' 22-in Professor Meikeljohn's terms,
"speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which
voters have to deal."'' 23 The Court has of course recognized that
421 U.S. at 826.
96 S. Ct. at 1826-30.
'2' See note 113 supra.
12 This premise is also apparent in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct.
2440 (1976), where Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, found that the lower first amend-
ment value of nonobscene but "sexually explicit" adult films justifies more restrictive zoning
of adult theaters than of ordinary movie houses. The plurality opinion found support for this
position in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, where "[a]s Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out...
the 'difference between commercial price and product advertising .. .and ideological
communication' permits regulation of the former that the First Amendment would not toler-
ate with respect to the latter." Id. at 2451 n.31. Justice Stevens's view that sexually explicit
speech is more susceptible to regulation was a minority position, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. However, one of the dissenters, Justice Stewart,
specifically advocated more rigorous regulation of commercial speech in Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1832-35 (1976). Thus, at
least five justices (six if Justice Blackmun is added) have recognized that the lower value of
commercial speech justifies regulating it more rigorously.
122 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
' A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLIrCAL FREEDOM 79 (1960). Under the Meiklejohn view, commercial
advertising would be entitled only to "due process" protection as "private speech." Id. at 79,
83; see Hastie, Free Speech: Contrasting Constitutional Concepts and their Consequences, 9
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 428 (1974).
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other desirable ends are served by the first amendment, 24 such as
furthering the search for truth and maximizing individual self-
expression, and has extended first amendment protection beyond
the discussion of political subjects' 25 and the expression of ideas.' 2
Nevertheless, when the Court has denied first amendment protec-
tion to particular categories of speech, such as obscenity' 27 and
"fighting words,""'2 it has relied on the low value of such speech in
aiding the search for truth, advancing self-expression, but above all,
contributing to democratic self-government.' 29
Courts have long recognized that commercial advertising has
lower first amendment value than traditionally protected forms of
expression. 3 ' In Bigelow and Virginia Board of Pharmacy the Court
reaffirmed this principle in acknowledging that as a rule commercial
advertising does not make "any direct contribution to the inter-
change of ideas," but only to private economic decision making and
public allocation of resources.' 3 ' However, the Court recognized that
commercial advertising indirectly contributes to the ends tradition-
ally served by the first amendment by supplying the public with
information, images, and values that may enter into the discussion
" See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
Cm. L. REV. 20, 23 (1975); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 884-87 (1963); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REV. 245, 256-57.
'2 See, e.g., UMW District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 376, 388 (1967).
212 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 566 (1969); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
I" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
"2 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973). See also note 28 supra.
' The traditional view of the first amendment value of commercial advertising was
expressed by Chief Judge Bazelon in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of the interests the
First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, it does not affect the political process, does
not contribute to the exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters of
public importance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a form of individual self-
expression.
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 201 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); New Yorl Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Holiday
Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20, 24-26 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 687 (7th
Cir. 1974).
228 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1827 (1976); id. at 1835 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822
(1975).
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of public issues and the creation of works of artistic expression.'32
This insight into the indirect first amendment value of com-
mercial speech was partially responsible for the Court's rejection in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy of a case-by-case "public interest" test
for determining whether particular advertisements are entitled to
some first amendment protection. The Court expressed doubt that
a clear line between "publicly 'interesting' or 'important' advertis-
ing and the opposite kind could ever be drawn." ' 33 Another reason
the Court rejected the public interest test was that such a distinc-
tion would be difficult to enforce. A commercial advertiser con-
fronted with a prohibition of advertising for his product would only
have to "append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve
immunity from the law's command." '34 To prevent evasion of adver-
tising regulations through sham editorializing, the courts would
have to delve into an advertiser's motives, in effect using a different
form of the primary purpose test. 135 Although the Court in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy raised these objections against a test for distin-
guishing unprotected from partially protected commercial speech,
the arguments apply as well to a test for distinguishing partially
protected commercial speech from fully protected speech.
The difficulties in drawing a line between advertising that con-
32 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy the Court also noted that commercial speech may have
first amendment value because it assists consumers in making purchasing decisions and thus
facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. See text and notes at notes 73-75 supra.
Although these functions of advertising may provide support for according some first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech, it can hardly be said that all advertising increases
the flow of valuable information to consumers. Obviously, a false advertisement does not
assist consumers in making the proper economic decision. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830-31 (1976). Because all commercial
advertising does not faciliate the allocation of resources, this value cannot serve as the basis
for a definition of commercial speech.
"1 96 S. Ct. at 1827. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), decided less than a year
earlier, was widely interpreted as having adopted a "public interest" test for measuring the
degree of protection to be accorded to commercial advertising. See notes 87 & 91 supra. The
Court's rejection of a "public interest" test for commercial speech parallels the development
of the New York Times libel privilege. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
the plurality adopted a public interest test for determining when to apply the actual malice
standard. The test was rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), because
of "the difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which
publications address issues of'general or public interest' and which do not-to determine...
'what information is relevant to self-government.' .. We doubt the wisdom of committing
this task to the consciences of judges." Id. at 346.
,31 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 832 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quoting
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942); see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1827 (1976); 8 IND. L. REv. 890, 896
(1975).
35 See text and notes at notes 25-26 supra.
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tains information and opinion of public interest and "purely com-
mercial" advertising should not lead the courts to ignore the impor-
tant differences between editorial advertising and commercial
hucksterism in formulating a definition of commercial speech. An
appropriate definition of commercial speech should reflect its lower
order of value as well as provide workable guidance to courts, agen-
cies, and advertisers. Three possible definitions may meet these
goals.
1. Speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction. The "classic example" of commercial speech men-
tioned in Pittsburgh Press'3 and Virginia Board of Pharmacy'37 is
an obvious definitional candidate. 8 Since most commercial propos-
als directly contribute only to the allocation of private resources, not
to the formation of public opinion, speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction" shares the indicium of low value
the Court has perceived in commercial speech. If this definition
requires an express proposal of a commercial transaction,' 3 how-
ever, it is seriously underinclusive. Few television or billboard ad-
vertisements expressly propose a commercial transaction; yet these
forms of advertising frequently have no more traditional first
amendment value than advertisements that do contain a proposal,
such as the want ads in Pittsburgh Press or the drug price advertise-
ments in Virginia Board of Pharmacy.
This underinclusiveness can be repaired by interpreting the
definition to encompass implied as well as express commercial pro-
,"' Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973); see text at notes 45-46 supra.
"I Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1826, 1830 n.24 (1976).
"I For cases implicitly adopting the commercial proposal definition of commercial
speech, see Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 796 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1976); Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d
1, 239 N.W.2d 536 (1976); Economy Carpets Mfrs. & Distribs., Inc. v. Better Business Bureau,
330 So. 2d 301 (La. 1976); Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 38 N.Y.2d 364, 342 N.E.2d 583, 379
N.Y.S.2d 815, 820 (1975).
'"' The Court's use of "express language" tests to measure first amendment rights has
been confined to fully protected speech. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 646-
47 (1976), the Court, construing vague language in the Federal Election Campaign Act limit-
ing expenses made "relative to" a candidate, held that since this provision applied to fully
protected speech it should be restricted "to expenditures for communications that in express
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." Id.
at 647 n.52. Similarly, in the context of advocacy of criminal acts the Court has adopted a
test requiring express advocacy of imminent violence or lawlessness. See note 197 infra;
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 728 (1975).
[44:205
Protection for Commercial Advertising
posals. But an implied proposal test would be difficult to apply in
a consistent and predictable manner. Courts would probably inter-
pret a picture of a cigarette package against a pastoral setting or a
television testimonial that "Brand X worked for me" as implied
proposals of a transaction; however, the standards for making these
judgments are unclear. When courts are called on to make more
difficult judgments, such as determining whether a televised adver-
tisement boasting of the productivity of a steel company constitutes
an implied proposal to sell steel, the definition could lead to unjusti-
fiably inconsistent results. The commercial proposal definition is
thus caught in an unhappy dilemma: in one version it is underinclu-
sive; in the other it is excessively vague.'
2. Speech of interest to a nondiverse consumer audience. A
second formulation of the commercial speech definition is suggested
by Bigelow v. Virginia. The Court spoke of the advertisement under
consideration as "of potential interest and value to a diverse
audience-not only to readers possibly in need of the services of-
fered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine
interest, in the subject matter."'' This passage suggests that the
commercial speech concept should be restricted to speech of interest
only to those individuals who form the potential market for the
commodity or service advertised.'42 Although similar to the public
interest test, this approach is narrower, and would avoid the ambi-
guities inherent in defining the public interest.4 3 A nondiverse audi-
ence test also appears to encompass more of the speech sharing the
characteristic of lower value than the express proposal definition.
Speech of interest only to actors in a particular economic market-
place includes both express proposals of a transaction and messages
of more subtle persuasion.
Unfortunately, the nondiverse audience test is also underinclu-
sive. An advertisement could attract a diverse following by virtue
of publicity about its patent falseness, or about the illegality of the
proposed transaction, rather than by virtue of the information or
ideas presented.'" Under the nondiverse audience test, such adver-
" See text following note 151 infra.
" Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (emphasis added).
2 For a case relying in part on a diverse audience test for commercial speech, see
Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, 639 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
"' See note 133 supra. For an analysis of the closely related, and equally elusive, concept
of newsworthiness, see Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in
the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 722 (1963).
"I See 42 TENN. L. REV. 573, 581 (1975); cf. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United
States, 491 F.2d 214, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1974) (rejecting the premise "that the size of the class
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tisements would be treated as noncommercial speech.
The test has other serious shortcomings. As Bigelow illus-
trates,'45 it is not clear how a court is to ascertain whether an adver-
tisement has a diverse appeal. Would survey data or expert testi-
mony be admissible to show a diverse audience, or would the court
rely on its own intuition?'46 The nondiverse audience definition also
seems vulnerable to the sham editorializing that the Court hoped
to avoid by rejecting a "public interest" test for protected advertis-
ing;'47 some form of primary purpose test would be required to pre-
vent the test from becoming unenforceable. These administrative
difficulties and the underinclusiveness of the test make another
alternative preferable.
3. Speech about a brand name product or service. A third
alternative defines commercial speech as speech about a brand
name product or service' 4-that is, speech about a commercial com-
modity identifying the seller of the commodity.'49 This definition
includes implied as well as express commercial proposals and covers
all advertising that promotes particular products and services re-
gardless of the public's interest. While avoiding the underinclu-
siveness of the two previous alternatives, however, the test may
overinclusively reach speech that directly contributes to shaping
public opinion. Under the test the commercial speech category
of persons interested determines what is news"), vacated for possible mootness, 420 U.S. 371
(1975).
"I The Court found that the advertisement for a New York abortion referral agency was
"not unnewsworthy." 421 U.S. at 822. It is not clear whether the Court based this finding on
its assessment of the content of the advertisement or on judicial notice of the public contro-
versy surrounding the issue of abortion.
," See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
[Alssuming that under the [public interest test] .. .courts are not simply to take a
poll to determine whether a substantial portion of the population is interested or con-
cerned in a subject, courts will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest
in a particular event or subject. . . .The danger such a doctrine portends for freedom
of the press is apparent.
"I See text and note at note 134 supra.
"18 For cases accepting, at least by implication, the brand name limitation, see Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Baird v. La Follette, 72
Wis.2d 1, 239 N.W.2d 536, 539 (1976); cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1835 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (commercial advertis-
ing differs from ideological expression because it is limited to promoting specific goods and
services).
'"' In the case of want ads the identification of a particular seller, even if only by a phone
number or address, functions as a brand name. Want ads, therefore, would properly be
considered commercial speech under the brand name definition. Cf Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (employment want ads are
commercial speech); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
934 (1972) (housing want ads are commercial speech).
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would include, for example, advertising that provides detailed fac-
tual information about the health or safety effects of a brand name
product, or corporate advertising that rebuts the views of consumer
or environmental groups concerning a specific commodity.
The brand name definition would create administrative diffi-
culties not encountered in the other definitions examined. Some
commercial advertising is sponsored by trade associations, and no
brand name or particular seller is identified.'50 The Supreme Court's
understanding of the value of commercial advertising provides no
basis for according advertising by a trade association greater value
than advertising by a single seller. The identification of a particular
trade association should therefore be interpreted as a collective
brand name for a generic product or service. When this form of
advertising concerns specific generic products or services, it should
be treated as commercial speech. This step, however, still leaves
courts with the problem of distinguishing between trade association
advertising for specific types of generic goods, and trade association
image advertising touting the virtues of the industry.
Administrative problems under the brand name definition also
arise when the trade name of a particular corporation is synonymous
with the brand name of a product or service sold by that
corporation. If the mere use of such a corporate name is considered
to be within the definition, corporations and businesses would en-
gage in commercial speech whenever they used the company name,
even in a political tract unrelated to the firm's business. In order to
avoid giving sellers of commercial products indelible second-class
speech rights, courts should consider the context in which the com-
pany name is used to determine whether it refers to the corporate
entity or to a particular product.'5 1
On the other hand, the brand name definition avoids some of
the more troublesome problems of the alternative tests. Unlike the
implied proposal version of the commercial proposal test, the brand
'" See National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, FTC No. 8987 (July 20, 1976). A trade
association of egg distributors' advertisements asserted that no competent or reliable scien-
tific evidence demonstrates that eating eggs in quantity increases the risks of heart disease.
The FTC found the advertisements deceptive and ruled that it had jurisdiction to prohibit
their distribution since the sponsoring group had a direct financial interest in the sale of eggs
and the advertising was intended to increase egg consumption. Id. at 3-7.
"' An editorial advertisement about energy policy signed by the "Exxon Corporation"
would not be commercial speech if Exxon's products are not specifically mentioned, but a
billboard carrying only the name "Exxon" should be construed to refer to a brand of gasoline
and therefore to be commercial speech. Difficult borderline cases would likely arise, such as
an Exxon advertisement that uses its own product to illustrate a discussion of the trend of
gasoline prices.
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name test employs a single comprehensible standard: does the
speech identify a particular seller or sellers of a specific type of
commercial good? In contrast to the nondiverse audience test, it
does not require the courts to ascertain the attitudes and interests
of the general public. The problem of sham editorializing which
attended previous tests should not undermine the brand name defi-
nition. Instances of "mixed" commercial and editorial advertising' 2
can be treated along the lines suggested by obscenity cases, in which
the Court has considered a hypothetical pornographer who attaches
"a quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf" to invoke the protection
of the first amendment.'5 3 The Court has implied that if the unpro-
tected material is not rationally related to the protected expression,
the entire publication may be suppressed.'54 The speaker has the
option of deleting the unprotected material and republishing the
protected message with no loss in its meaning or nuance.'55 Analo-
gously, an advertisement that refers to a brand name product and
contains editorial commentary should be treated as commercial
speech if the editorial message could be republished without the
brand name and lose no meaning or implication.'56
152 See Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob.
juris. noted, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976).
"I Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam); see also Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).
,", Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1972) (per curiam).
155 See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity under Miller v.
California, 88 HARV. L. RE V. 1838, 1856 (1975).
151 In most circumstances severing brand names from editorial advertising will not
create serious difficulties. For regulation of false and deceptive advertising the severability
principle means that representations about brand name products in an advertisement can
be regulated as commercial speech, even if editorial or public interest statements are also
present. However, a false statement of fact in the editorial portion unrelated to a brand name
product would not trigger rigorous regulation of falsity, even if a brand name product is
mentioned elsewhere in the advertisement. Similarly, few difficulties should arise when the
advertisement as a whole must be classified as commercial or noncommercial for purposes of
time, place and manner regulation-the problem in Chrestensen-or where commercial ad-
vertisements for certain products or services are forbidden altogether-the problem in
Bigelow. Under the severability principle the advertisements considered in both Chrestensen
and Bigelow would be commercial speech, since the "public interest" message in either case
could be republished without the accompanying identification of a particular seller or serv-
ices.
The primary inadequacy of the severability test occurs in cases where a brand name
product or service is itself the subject of an editorial advertisement. In this narrow context
courts should consider whether the reference to the brand name product is made to condition
the market for the product or to contribute to the discussion of public issues. Cf. Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (use of threatening language against the President of
the United States found to be intended as political hyperbole). Thus, even under the severa-
bility test, a narrow area remains where scrutiny of the intention or purpose of the advertiser
is necessary.
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In practice, the scope and operation of the three proposed
definitions would not vary greatly. A typical corporate image adver-
tisement 5 1 that does not refer specifically to the corporation's
goods or services would likely be held noncommercial speech under
each alternative. Each of the proposed definitions is either under-
inclusive or overinclusive in terms of precisely reflecting the lower
order of value the Supreme Court has discerned in commercial
speech. Under the two-level theory of commercial speech the over-
inclusiveness of the brand name definition would make it uncon-
stitutionally overbroad since it would permit government sup-
pression of advertising with traditionally recognized first amend-
ment value.'58 After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, however, the func-
tion of a definition of commercial speech is not to separate fully
protected from unprotected speech, but rather to distinguish fully
protected speech from speech subject to governmental regulation
under a less rigorous balancing test.'59 An underinclusive definition
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the government to
regulate certain types of commercial advertising; an overinclusive
11 Corporate image advertising has been defined as advertising that "describes the cor-
poration itself, its activities or its policies, but does not explicitly describe any products or
services sold by the corporation." FTC Staff, Statement of Enforcement Policy by the Federal
Trade Commission Regarding Corporate Image Advertising 1-2 (Dec. 4, 1974). Obviously such
advertising could not be considered commercial speech under the brand name definition. See
Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, Corporate Image Advertising: A Discussion of the Factors That
Distinguish Those Corporate Image Advertising Practices Protected Under the First Amend-
ment from Those Subject to Control by the Federal Trade Commission, 51 J. URBAN L. 405
(1974). The authors suggest that "for corporate image advertising to be subject to control,
the false, deceptive, misleading or unfair portion of the advertisement must have an apprecia-
ble effect on the market-place appeal of the advertiser's product or service." Id. at 418. Their
illustration of this principle indicates that it is substantially identical to the brand name
definition.
Thus, a steel company could discuss the ills of drugs in deceptive terms, but it could
not use deception in discussing its method of producing steel. A drug company could
discuss its personnel policies without losing first amendment protection, provided it did
not infer [sic] that those policies produced better drugs. A wood-products company
could advertise the need for reforestation, but it could not escape control if it implied
that its growing methods produced better lumber.
Id. at 418-19. For a contrary view, see Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising,
59 MINN. L. REv. 189, 200-01, 203-04 (1974) (rejecting the product-marketplace test as too
inflexible and advocating case-by-case balancing).
" In obscenity and fighting words cases, which are still analyzed under the two-level
theory, the Court has been repeatedly concerned to frame a narrow definition of nonprotected
speech that does not encompass speech with first amendment value. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972); Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words). This concern has not carried
over into the commercial speech context.
"I See text and notes at notes 99-104 supra.
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definition would provide some commercial advertising, which may
contain a particularly valuable message, a lower degree of protec-
tion than that afforded a similar message uttered outside the com-
mercial context. If the choice is between more effective vindication
of the public interests served by advertising regulations and a mar-
ginal infringement on the first amendment rights of advertisers, the
overinclusive definition seems preferable. The brand name defini-
tion, because of its ease of application, also seems the most work-
able.
C. Further Limitations on the Definition of Commercial Speech
The substantive inadequacies of all three definitional alterna-
tives may be mitigated by other limits on the commercial speech
definition that help assure that the reduction in first amendment
protection afforded commercial advertising does not endanger im-
portant interests. First, the definition should apply only to speakers
who have a financial interest either in the sale of the particular
product or service being advertised or in the sale of a competing
product or service. Media distributors of commercial advertising
should be found to engage in commercial speech only if they have
received compensation for disseminating the advertisement.
The financial interest limitation, which has been generally re-
spected by the courts, 110 reflects the judgment that the first amend-
ment rights of authors, publishers, and broadcasters without such
an interest should not be diminished when they speak on a commer-
cial subject. 6' The limit is supported by the fundamental first
amendment policy of according publishers and broadcasters vir-
tually absolute editorial discretion to choose subjects to speak
10 See New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 214, 224 (3d Cir.
1974), remanded for possible mootness, 420 U.S. 371 (1975) (dictum); compare Perma-Maid
Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941), with Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 644
(3d Cir. 1941) (virtually identical information about health effects of using aluminum cook-
ware not subject to regulation as deceptive advertising when disseminated by publisher with
no financial interest in competing product, but subject to regulation when disseminated by
competing manufacturer). But see SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (suggesting that the financial reports about securities
in a newspaper for financial analysts were commercial speech); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 543 (D. Mass. 1974) (ruling that an allegation that
a consumer magazine made false statements about a commercial product states a cause of
action against the magazine under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125a (1970)).
"' See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973); cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct.
1817, 1825 (1976) ("No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being
heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or
their advertisement forbidden").
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about."' If publishers and broadcasters enjoyed only reduced first
amendment protection for speech about brand name products, they
could be deterred from engaging in robust discussion about contro-
versial commercial activity."'3 The limit also reflects a judgment
that disinterested speech on commercial affairs will be more objec-
tive and sensitive to subjects of general public interest than speech
by individuals with a financial stake in promoting a product. Fi-
nally, since individuals with such a financial interest are likely to
resist the chilling effect of governmental regulation,"'4 their speech
can be regulated more thoroughly than the speech of disinterested
individuals without inducing silence.
Second, commercial speech should be defined to exclude adver-
tising for activity that itself is protected by the first amendment.
Advertisements for political, religious, or associational activities
and for protected written works should be fully protected as an
incident to the first amendment value of the underlying speech or
activity."' The additional value of such advertising does not depend
on the presence of any ideas or information of public interest in the
advertisement' 6 or on the absence of financial interest on the part
of the advertiser,"'7 but derives from the constitutionally protected
"I See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126-27 (1973).
,,3 For an example of robust discussion about brand name products, see R. NADER,
UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1972).
I Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1830 n.24 (1976).
"I See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 645 (1976) (limitation of personal expendi-
tures for a candidate to an amount which would have prohibited placing a single, quarter-
page advertisement in a major metropolitan newspaper held unconstitutional); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (advertisement soliciting funds for civil rights
movement held noncommercial speech); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (advertising campaign to influence legislature held exempt
from antitrust laws); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (solicitation of union member-
ship treated as fully protected speech); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (adver-
tisement for religious book cannot be regulated as commercial speech). But compare Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding ordinance prohibiting door-to-door sales of
periodicals), with id.at 650 n. 1 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (finding ordinance uncon-
stitutional as applied to solicitation of periodicals and distinguishing "merchant who goes
from door to door selling pots"). See also Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432
(1971).
I, Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 648 (1976) ("Advocacy of the election or defeat of
candidates. . . is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discus-
sion of political policy generally . . ."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (first
amendment protects vigorous advocacy as well as abstract discussion).
"' See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct.
1817, 1825 (1976) (speech is protected "even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase
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subject being promoted.' 8 To treat such advertising as commercial
speech would inhibit the rights of publishers and authors to distrib-
ute their works and the rights of various organizations to recruit
members, solicit funds, and publicize their ideas.' 9
Stated in full, the definition of commercial speech suggested by
this comment is (1) speech that refers to a specific brand name
product or service, (2) made by a speaker with a financial interest
in the sale of the advertised product or service, in the sale of a
competing product or service, or in the distribution of the speech,
(3) that does not advertise an activity itself protected by the first
amendment. This definition, though not without difficulties, should
prove workable for courts applying the Supreme Court's ruling that
commercial speech is not "wholly outside the protection of the First
Amendment." 0
Ill. THE STANDARD OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court formulated the standard for
determining the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations
as "assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing
it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation.''
Implicit in this standard is the view that different types of commer-
cial speech have different first amendment value, and that the mag-
nitude of governmental interest sufficient to justify an advertising
regulation will vary according to the value of the advertising.' 72 Al-
or otherwise contribute money"); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
I" Apparently advertising for activity protected by constitutional rights other than the
first amendment can qualify as commercial speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822
(1975), the Court implied that the fact the abortion advertisement pertained to "constitu-
tional interests" enhanced its first amendment value. However, the Court accorded the adver-
tisement no greater protection than the "purely commercial" advertising in Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), or in Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). See text
and notes at notes 88-97 supra. Thus the constitutional right to privacy, in which the right
to have an abortion is grounded, does not place advertising for abortion services outside the
scope of the commercial speech doctrine. See Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp.
321, 337 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976).
" ' For cases recognizing the constitutional right to associate for the advancement of
beliefs, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 636-37 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
"I Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1825 (1976); id. at 1833 (Stewart, J., concurring).
,7, 421 U.S. at 826 (1975).
,72 Id. The Court stated:
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though Bigelow is not entirely consistent in stating a general stan-
dard for review,7 3 the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy adopted
the balancing approach; it carefully articulated the first amend-
ment value of the advertising under consideration and scrutinized
the governmental interests asserted in support of the regulation.
The Court also.took the first steps toward identifying the different
degrees of governmental interest required to sustain regulation in
particular commercial speech contexts,' and isolated a number of
variables that may justify more rigorous regulation of some types of
commercial speech. '75 Rather than attempting a comprehensive sur-
vey of the ingredients that should be balanced in assessing the valid-
ity of regulations of commercial speech, this comment will examine
four recurring types of controls to illustrate the operation of the
balancing approach: regulation of false or deceptive advertising;
time, place, and manner regulation of advertising with specific con-
The diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech "commer-
cial" in widely varying degrees. We need not decide here the extent to which constitu-
tional protection is afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the
face of all kinds of regulation.
'7 At one point the Court stated that "advertising, like all public expression, may be
subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest." 421 U.S. at 826;
see id. at 825 n.10. Insofar as this statement applies to noncommercial speech, it contradicts
the central tenet that expression related to issues of public importance or to the search for
truth can be regulated only upon a showing of a significant or compelling government interest.
See note 23 supra. The cases cited in Bigelow for this proposition all, with the exception of
Pittsburgh Press, dealt with time, place, and manner regulations of noncommercial speech.
421 U.S. at 826 & n.11 (1975), citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974);
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965);
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94
(1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). Thus, the "reasonable regulation
that serves a legitimate public interest" may have been intended to refer only to content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulation. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 47, 120 n.56 (1975). Even under this interpretation, the Court misstated the recog-
nized standard, which requires the furtherance of "significant" or "important" not merely
"legitimate" government interests. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
217 (1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
Other language in Bigelow implies that the value of commercial speech and the weight
of government interests should be assessed entirely on a case-by-case basis. 421 U.S. at 826;
see 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 653 (1976). While consistent with the overall balancing standard,
this approach precludes the development of the generalized guidelines necessary if advertis-
ers, media, and consumers are to be apprised of their constitutional rights, and if courts are
to reach consistent resolutions of competing interests. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974). See also Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1026 (1972); Frantz, The First Amendment
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
'" 96 S. Ct. at 1830-31.
17 Id. at 1830 n.24; id. at 1833-35 (Stewart, J., concurring); see text and notes at notes
114-19 supra.
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tent; prohibitions of advertising with specific content; and regula-
tion of the media as distributors of advertising.
A. Regulation of False or Deceptive Advertising
The Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy recognized that "un-
truthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected
for its own sake.' 17 6 Because untruthful speech generally has little
or no first amendment value, false commercial speech may be regu-
lated without requiring a demonstration in each case that legitimate
public interests justify the regulation.'77 The Court also noted sev-
eral contextual factors that justify regulating factually erroneous
commercial speech more rigorously than false statements of fact
outside the commercial context. Because businesses have strong
financial incentives to advertise, superior access to the facts about
their products and services, and are not subject to severe time pres-
sures in preparing advertisements, and because factual disputes
about commercial products can be objectively resolved, commercial
speech is more durable in the face of governmental regulation than
noncommercial speech.7 '
The Court suggested that the low value of false commercial
speech and the durability of commercial advertising permit the gov-
ernment to regulate commercial speech that is not demonstrably
false, but only deceptive or misleading. 7 ' In fact, in a footnote, the
Court went so far as to suggest that some forms of commercial
"1 96 S. Ct. at 1830; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) ("there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact"). But see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("disregard of the 'truth' may be employed to give force to the underlying idea expressed by
the speaker"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
,?? See 96 S. Ct. at 1830. The Federal Trade Commission has interpreted Virginia Board
of Pharmacy not to require a case-by-case examination of the sufficiency of the governmental
interest in the control of false and deceptive advertising. In National Comm'n on Egg Nutri-
tion, FTC No. 8987 (July 20, 1976), the FTC stated:
We doubt that the Bigelow case compels the application of a balancing of interests test
in each particular case before any regulation whatsoever may be applied to misleading
commercial speech. That balance has already been struck on a categorical basis, a fact
recognized by the Supreme Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy if not in Bigelow itself.
Id. at 32. For earlier cases holding fraudulent or deceptive advertising unprotected, see, e.g.,
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d
735, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1956).
' See text and notes at notes 114-19 supra.
' ' Despite the Court's approval of more extensive control over the veracity of commercial
speech, regulations of deceptive advertising should be narrowly tailored to cure the deception
with minimal interference to the advertising copy. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611
(3d Cir. 1976). Further, the Court should not be interpreted as sanctioning the governmental
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advertising-such as advertising for medical or legal services-
might be considered "inherently deceptive" given the nature of
the services involved.8 0
The Court also noted that false or deceptive commercial speech
can be regulated by methods that would not be tolerated outside the
commercial context. The Court implicitly approved requirements of
affirmative disclosures in advertising and the use of prior restraints
such as cease and desist orders to enforce administrative determina-
tions of advertising deception.' 8' Presumably the requirement of a
reviewable hearing before such an order is issued, mandated by the
Court in other contexts involving injunctions or administrative li-
censes, such as obscenity regulation, also applies to the administra-
tive regulation of false or deceptive commercial speech. 8 1
The lower value of commercial speech and the durability of
business advertising also lessen the need for prophylactic
rules-such as a mens rea requirement-protecting untruthful com-
mercial speech in order to ensure the free flow of truthful commer-
regulation of statements of opinion on public issues, no matter how erroneous they appear to
the regulators. See National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, or FTC No. 8987, at 34 (July 20,
1976).
116 96 S. Ct. at 1831 n.25; see id. at 1831-32 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Court gave
little credence to the arguments that price advertising by pharmacists would drive scrupulous
practitioners out of business and damage the image of the profession. Id. at 1828-29. Both
arguments-in addition to concern about deception of the public-have been frequently put
forward as justifications for prohibiting advertising by other professional groups. See Semler
v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.608, 612 (1935); Note, Advertising, Solici-
tation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1187-
91 (1972). This term the Court has the opportunity to clarify whether the only permissible
justification for the regulation of advertising by lawyers is the interest in preventing public
deception. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz.), prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct.
53 (1976). If the only constitutionally sufficient interest in regulating advertising by profes-
sionals is the prevention of public deception, state-enforced rules prohibiting all legal or
medical advertising are clearly overbroad, since it is not difficult to think of some advertising
by professionals-such as the identification of a practitioner and his field of specializa-
tion-that would not be deceptive in any way.
"1 96 S. Ct. at 1830 n.24; see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) (ruling that narrow injunction of repetitive course of
commercial advertising did not constitute an impermissible prior restraint).
I' See, e.g., Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970). Outside
the commercial context the use of injunctions or schemes requiring regulatory approval of
speech would constitute a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint. See, e.g., Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). It has been suggested that the rationale
for excepting commercial speech from the prohibition against prior restraints is the exception-
ally low value of commercial advertising. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 55, 158-60 (1973). The resistance of this type of speech to the chilling effect of govern-
mental regulation, however, is an equally relevant factor.
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cial speech.'"3 The Court did not consider whether to condition the
liability of business advertisers for false statements of fact upon a
showing of fault as required by the libel cases.1 4 Since the mens rea
requirement in the libel cases is grounded on the potential chilling
effect that large damage awards against the media could have on
vigorous reporting of true information of public interest,'85 the mens
rea requirement can be dispensed with in regulating false or decep-
tive speech by advertisers, at least in cases in which relief is limited
to a cease and desist order.'88
B. Time, Place, and Manner Regulation of Advertising with a
Specific Content
Virginia Board of Pharmacy implies that greater governmental
interests are required to support regulation of truthful commercial
speech than to support regulation of false advertising. The Court
also suggests that a time, place, and manner regulation of truthful
advertising that "singles out speech of a particular content" for
special treatment 7 should be scrutinized more closely than a re-
striction not based on the content of the speech. The principle that
content-specific regulations are more suspect than content-neutral
regulations applies outside the commercial context as well.'88
The Court's indication that content-specific regulations of com-
mercial speech are suspect should not be interpreted to mean that
time, place, and manner regulations that distinguish generally be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech are necessarily in-
valid. A better interpretation of the Court's language is that time,
place, and manner regulations that discriminate between speech of
approximately equal value should be carefully scrutinized. Under
this interpretation, time, place, and manner discrimination among
'" Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817,
1839 n.24 (1976); id. at 1833 (Stewart, J., concurring). The chilling effect of regulation applied
to business advertisers is especially minimal if the regulation consists only of a cease and
desist order directed at future advertising, as has been the case with FTC regulation of
deceptive advertising. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V 1975).
"I See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
" See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
' A different result rffay be required, however, when the regulation applies to the media
distributing the advertisements. See text and notes at notes 243-53 infra.
" 96 S. Ct. at 1830.
" See, e.g., Erzonznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214-15 & n.13 (1975); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in
Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233; Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal
Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
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equally truthful advertisements for different products would be con-
stitutionally suspect; however, the different first amendment value
of ideological speech and commercial speech may make the com-
mercial speech definition an appropriate dividing line for different
degrees of time, place, and manner regulation. This is consistent
with Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,'89 where the plurality
upheld different zoning regulations for ordinary movie houses and
theatres featuring "sexually explicit" films on the ground that the
low first amendment value in adult films justifies different time,
place, and manner regulations of the theaters where they are fea-
tured."9 0
Under this interpretation, prohibitions of all commercial adver-
tising on billboards 9' or of all door-to-door commercial solicitation',
should be sustained if the different treatment of commercial and
noncommercial speech is supported by legitimate public interests.'13
However, a prohibition of billboard advertising for one product or
service, such as abortion clinics, when no other advertising is re-
stricted by content,'94 should be more strictly scrutinized, and per-
haps sustained only if supported by significant governmental inter-
ests.,15
C. Prohibitions of Advertising for Specific Products and Services
The constitutional problems raised by time, place, and manner
regulations of speech with specific content are even more apparent
when the government attempts to prohibit such speech altogether.
The volume of constitutional litigation'96 concerning prohibitions of
U 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976).
'" Id. at 2452.
' See Howard v. State Dep't of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973); Markham
Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316
(1969).
'" Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
"I See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975) (characterizing Valentine v. Chres-
tensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), as upholding a "reasonable regulation of the manner in which
commercial advertising could be distributed").
"I See Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich.
1972).
,, See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972); Stone, supra note 188.
' See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertisement for abortion referral
agency); Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob. juris.
noted, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976) (prohibition of abortion and contraceptive advertising); Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); United
States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (prohibitions of
discriminatory advertising); Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 936 (1970) (prohibition of advertising means to procure divorce); New York State
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truthful advertising for specific products or services, and the seri-
ousness with which content-specific speech regulation is viewed out-
side the commercial speech context,197 warrant a detailed examina-
tion of the appropriate standard of review for such prohibitions.
Prohibitions of truthful advertising for particular commodities
and services are enacted in response to a quality of the commodity
or activity advertised rather than of the speech itself.' 8 The pro-
moted product may have an undesirable effect on the health or well-
being of consumers,"9 may endanger third parties,"' or may
threaten community moral standards.20 ' The government's purpose
in prohibiting truthful advertising for such commodities and serv-
ices is to protect health, safety, and welfare by controlling public
demand for the products. The standard for evaluating such prohibi-
tions may depend on whether the government has expressed its
interest in controlling demand by making the advertised transaction
itself illegal.
Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061
(1970) (prohibition of lottery broadcasts); United States v. Trentman, 408 F. Supp. 994 (C.D.
Cal. 1976) (prohibition of mailing pandering advertisements).
'" Outside the commercial speech context the Court has erected a highly protective
standard for determining when speech advocating undesirable activity may be punished.
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). A similarly protective standard applies even
if the speech involved is not expressly political. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 404 (1970) (solicitation of a crime governed by incitement test); 1 NATIONAL
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 371 (1970) (proposed Federal
Criminal Code solicitation of crime section drafted to conform to incitement standard); cf.
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688
(1959) (first amendment "protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be
proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax"); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95,
101-03 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (advocacy of polygamy cannot be punished if it falls
short of specific incitement). The protective requirements of express incitement and immi-
nent danger have not been imposed when the speech involved is commercial. See Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
"I See generally Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1005, 1036 (1967); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. Rv.
1191, 1195-98 (1965).
I" See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971)
(dictum), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (upholding ban on broadcasting of cigarette commer-
cials).
See, e.g., N. DAK. CENT. CODE § 62-01-14 (5) (1960) (prohibiting placard advertising
by licensed retail pistol dealers).
2' See, e.g., New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 900 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970) (sustaining prohibition of broadcasting of promo-
tional lottery advertisements).
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1. Prohibitions of Advertising for Illegal Products and
Services. In Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court sustained a prohi-
bition of speech proposing an illegal transaction without subjecting
the prohibition to scrutiny under a balancing test; the Court indi-
cated, however, that such scrutiny would have been required had
the prohibition applied to speech proposing a legal transaction.112
The distinction between promoting illegal and legal commercial
transactions conforms to the traditional understanding of first
amendment values. 213 Ideological speech that incites the commis-
sion of an unlawful act does not enrich the debate on public issues
that can lead to peaceful change, but only serves to induce illegal
action.2 14 Similarly, commercial speech that proposes an illegal
transaction does not inform or persuade individuals in their lawful
exercise of economic options, but only promotes activity that is
outside the sphere of legitimate consumer choice. Because such
speech has very little first amendment value, it can be prohibited
without a case-by-case inquiry into the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's interests.
2. Prohibitions of Advertising for Legal Products and Serv-
ices: Less Restrictive Alternatives. The Court has not spoken di-
rectly to the circumstances in which truthful advertising for a legal
commodity or enterprise can constitutionally be suppressed.2 5 The
2 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-
89 (1973). This ruling was reaffirmed in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975), and
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1824
(1976).
2 See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191,
1196 (1965). For commentary critical of the Court's distinction between advertising for legal
and illegal transactions, see De Vore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 745, 761-63 (1975) ("government policy need only to be translated
into a legal prohibition to justify restrictions on the press"); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term,
89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 118 (1975) (the difficulty of determining the exact nature of the activity
being advertised could generate complex problems about whether prohibition of underlying
activity is constitutional); 61 CORNELL L. REv. 640, 644 n.15 (1976) ("illegality has little to
do with the public-interest aspect of the advertisement").
2"I See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.) (L. Hand, J.)
("Words. . . which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude
of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government in a
democratic state") rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
448 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (direct incitement of crime may be punished);
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949) (speech used as integral part of
unlawful scheme may be punished). Vigorous advocacy of lawful objectives is protected by
the first amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534-36 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1939).
215 Although the Court has not expressly taken a position on the constitutionality of
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first amendment value of truthful advertising for legal products and
services and the traditional suspicion of regulations that single out
speech with a particular content for special treatment indicate that
courts should scrutinize prohibitions of truthful advertising for par-
ticular lawful products or services more carefully than other types
of advertising regulations. A more demanding standard than bal-
ancing advertising regulations against legitimate governmental in-
terests is required. 211
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court forcefully recognized
a parallel between advocacy of legal activity in the political world
and in the realm of production and consumption. 20 7 The Court found
that all the reasons advanced to support the prohibition of drug
price advertising rested on protecting citizens by keeping them igno-
rant "of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are
offering. ' 26 Justice Blackmun noted:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information
is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the
forbidding truthful advertising for lawful products, arguably a shift in the Court's attitude
regarding the proper level of scrutiny for such regulation occurred between Bigelow and
Virginia Board of Pharmacy. In Bigelow, the Court twice implied that to permit the prohibi-
tion of advertising the advertised commercial activity need only be "subject to regulation,"
a status considerably broader than illegality. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10, 826. In addition, the fact
that the advertised abortion services were legal was treated as just one factor to be weighed
in the overall balancing. Id. at 822. The impression created is that a similar standard of
protection applies whether the advertised activity is legal or not. In Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, however, the Court expressly sanctioned the prohibition of truthful advertising
only where the proposed transaction is "illegal in any way." 96 S. Ct. at 1831. Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent interpreted this unqualified language as forbidding the regulation of "active
promotion of prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes and other products the use of which it has
previously been thought desirable to discourage . . . so long as it is not misleading or does
not promote an illegal product or enterprise." 96 S. Ct. at 1835. Although this is probably an
exaggerated reading of the majority's holding, the fact that the Court expressed approval only
of prohibitions of truthful advertising for illegal enterprises may indicate that prohibitions
of advertising for legal activity will be scrutinized more strictly in the future.
For commentary suggesting that Bigelow erred in not adopting a significant or com-
pelling governmental interest standard for assessing commercial speech regulations, see The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HAiv. L. REV. 47, 120-21 & n.60 (1975); 61 CORNELL L. REv.
640, 650-53 (1976). This criticism ignores the fact that not all commercial speech has equiva-
lent value. The government should be allowed to regulate commercial speech of especially
low value, such as false advertising or advertising promoting illegal activity, more rigorously
in order to protect the legitimate nonspeech interests that commercial advertising may
threaten; but when commercial speech has greater value this higher level of scrutiny is
appropriate.
21 96 S. Ct. at 1829-30.
21 Id. at 1830.
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best means to that end is to open the channels of communica-
tion rather than to close them.2 19
The Court found that the first amendment had settled the choice
between these alternatives in favor of free communication. 210 Com-
mercial advertising that informs consumers about "entirely lawful"
options has a first amendment value not shared by commercial
advertising for illegal products.
Distaste for governmental interests grounded in paternalism is
also apparent in Bigelow, where the Court observed that "Virginia
is really asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear
or read about [lawful] New York services. ' 2 1 The Court suggested
that the state could have availed itself of a less restrictive alterna-
tive by disseminating information to enable women in Virginia who
were considering a New York abortion "to make better informed
decisions when they leave. ' 21 2 When an advertised commercial
transaction is legal, the state should try to influence the choice of
citizens whether to engage in the transaction by methods less re-
strictive than the suppression of all advertising.
In three recent decisions involving the prohibition of truthful
advertising for lawful commodities, judicial consideration of less
restrictive alternatives would have enriched the balancing process
and might have led to a different result. In Capital Broadcasting Co.
Id. at 1829.
21- Id. But cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (dictum) (state "blue
sky" laws that regulate what sellers of securities may publish about their offerings are to
"protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the exercise of
their own volition").
211 421 U.S. at 827.
212 Id. at 824.
2I For other commercial speech cases supporting a less restrictive alternatives analysis,
see Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 797 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov.
9, 1976); United States v. Pelligrino, 467 F.2d 41, 45 (9th Cir. 1972); Anderson, Clayton &
Co. v. Washington State Dep't of Agriculture, 402 F. Supp. 1253, 1257-58 (W.D. Wash. 1975);
Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16, 22
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974). See
generally Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974); Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943); The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 121 & n.62 (1975).
Less restrictive alternatives analysis does not require that the government adopt only
those alternatives that entail no loss of effectiveness or added costs. Rather it requires that
the potential gain in free speech from using less restrictive regulatory methods be weighed
against the loss in effectiveness or added costs of these alternatives. Thus, less restrictive
alternatives analysis involves balancing "at the margin." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1482, 1484-85 & n.16 (1975); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
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v. Mitchell,21 1 a three-judge district court sustained a congressional
prohibition of cigarette advertising on all broadcast media licensed
by the federal government;2 15 the Supreme Court affirmed without
an opinion. 211 The district court found that commercial advertising
is "less vigorously protected than other forms of speech" and had
no difficulty sustaining the statute since in its view Congress had
the power to prohibit the advertising of cigarettes in any media.2 17
Although the substantial public health danger from smoking justi-
fies at least some governmental regulation of cigarette advertising,
cigarette consumption is a lawful activity about which consumers
should be entitled to receive truthful information. Advertising regu-
lations to control demand for cigarettes that are less restrictive than
complete suppression include governmentally supplied or enforced
"counter speech" 218 such as the warnings concerning the health haz-
ards created by cigarette smoking that are now required on cigarette
advertising outside the electronic media.211 A court faced with a
total prohibition of cigarette advertising should consider whether
these less restrictive alternatives adequately serve the governmental
interests in controlling public demand for cigarettes. If so, the com-
plete prohibition should be overturned as unconstitutional.
A prohibition of cigarette advertising applicable only to the
electronic media is less onerous than a prohibition covering all
media. Cigarette manufacturers and consumers have access to fo-
rums other than radio and television for communicating and re-
ceiving commercial information about cigarettes. 22 However, re-
quiring cigarette advertising outside the electronic media only to
carry a health warning while prohibiting cigarette advertising on
21 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
215 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). The relevant portion reads:
Sec. 6. After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium
of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission.
218 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
287 333 F. Supp. at 584.
211 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975); cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies . . . the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence").
z"' Matter of Lorillard, 80 FTC 455 (1972) (consent order); see 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (1970)
(requiring health warning on cigarette packages).
2 The Court has often stated "that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); see, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975). In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, however, the Court stated
only that time, place and manner regulations must "leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of this information." 96 S. Ct. at 1830.
[44:205
Protection for Commercial Advertising
the electronic media raises a first amendment-equal protection
problem."' Since the prohibited advertisements contain true infor-
mation about a lawful product, the court should have required more
than a showing of reasonable governmental interests, or the "unique
characteristics of electronic communication, ' 2 to justify such dis-
parate treatment. The most persuasive reason for regulating radio
and television advertising more rigorously is that these forums cre-
ate a captive audience.2 2 In particular, regulators fear that impres-
sionable children will be exposed to advertising for a harmful prod-
uct they otherwise would not be induced to consume.24 This prob-
lem might be overcome without a total prohibition by banning ciga-
rette advertising from "family hour" viewing and allowing it at
times when few children are likely to be watching. Although a court
might ultimately reject this solution, since it is less effective than
complete prohibition in the electronic media, the alternative should
have been included in a meaningful balancing of the first amend-
ment interests at stake.22
21 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-98 (1972). See generally Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
12 Capital Broadcasting was distinguished on this basis in Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1831 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 387 (1973). For fuller exposition of the "unique characteristics" doctrine,
see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
2 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973)
(noting that "in a very real sense listeners and viewers constitute a 'captive audience'");
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 10-82, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See
generally Kozyris, Advertising Intrusion: Assault in the Sense, Trespass on the Mind-A
Remedy Through Separation, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (1975). The Court has given little weight
to the captive audience problem outside the broadcast context, at least when the affected
viewers or listeners can take relatively costless measures to avoid the offensive speech.
Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975), and Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), with Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1974)
(Douglas, J., concurring). The captivity problem presented by broadcast advertising is differ-
ent in that it pertains to subliminal persuasion rather than offensiveness. See Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Although
this concern should not justify the total exclusion of advertising for legal products from
television and radio, it may justify regulation of the time and manner of advertising particular
products in order to minimize the impact on minors. See Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-
Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27 STA. L. Rav. 1527, 1544-58 (1975).
121 See Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment,
27 STAN. L. REv. 1527, 1544-58 (1975).
22 A related problem is illustrated by a federal statute and regulations that prohibit the
broadcasting of lottery advertisements. See 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970); 47 C.F.R. § § 73.122, .292,
.656 (1976); New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970). See also New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United
States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 371 (1975). The statute
prohibits the broadcasting of all lottery advertisements regardless of the legality of the lottery
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A second illustration of less restrictive alternatives is provided
by the facts in United States v. Hunter.28 The Fourth Circuit up-
held a provision of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968227 prohib-
iting all discriminatory housing advertisements even though the Act
exempted owner-occupied facilities with less than five rental units
from the substantive antidiscrimination provisions of the statute.228
In upholding the total ban, the court found that discriminatory
advertisements for exempt housing may lead members of minority
groups to believe that the entire neighborhood surrounding the ad-
vertised housing is segregated. This belief could deter them from
seeking any housing in the area, including housing covered by the
Act.22 19 The court did not inquire whether the implication of neigh-
borhood segregation could be dispelled without a total prohibition
by a requirement that discriminatory advertisements for exempt
housing explicitly disclose- that the accommodations are exempt
from the Act. 20 This does not mean that the court was wrong in up-
holding the full prohibition of discriminatory advertising. Racial
discrimination in renting by owners of housing exempt from Title
VIII is actionable under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act, 21 pro-
under local law. See New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990, 996
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970). The sweeping prohibition is justified in part
on the ground that the use of interstate broadcast facilities by the operators of lawful lotteries
might result in extending these lotteries into states where they are prohibited. Id. at 996. The
federal role should be more carefully tailored to differing state policies, since it is left to the
states to determine the legal status of lotteries. Under this less restrictive policy, the federal
government could deny operators of illegal lotteries access to interstate communications
facilities, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970) (proscription of interstate transmission of wagering
information applies only where gambling is illegal in state of origin or state of destination);
S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1841 (1975), while allowing operators of legal lotteries to advertise,
provided they add a disclaimer that citizens of states where the lottery is illegal are not
permitted to participate. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2705.1 (Supp. 1975). This less restric-
tive regulation protects the interests of citizens where the lottery is legal, the state's interest
where the lottery is illegal, and does not burden the interstate dissemination of newspapers
and periodicals.
-1 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
2" 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (c) (1970). The statute reads:
It shall be unlawful to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published,
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimina-
tion.
42 U.S.C. § 3603 (b) (1970).
21 459 F.2d at 214.
2 Cf. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 229 (5th Cir. 1971)
(model decree requiring that housing advertisements include a statement disclosing that
"apartments are rented without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin").
=' 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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hibiting racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property.232
Hunter therefore may be valid within the rule of Pittsburgh Press
that advertising for unlawful discrimination can constitutionally be
prohibited.2 3 3 In ignoring this aspect of the issue, and relying on an
alternative interest that did not justify a total prohibition on dis-
criminatory advertising, the court's constitutional scrutiny was in-
complete.234
The third case, Morgan v. City of Detroit,235 involved a first
amendment challenge to a city ordinance making it illegal to "ac-
cost, solicit or invite another. . . to commit fornication or prostitu-
tion. 2 3 The plaintiffs argued that since prostitution was not a
crime in either the city of Detroit or the state of Michigan, and
fornication was not criminal in Michigan, the ordinance prohibited
"soliciting someone to perform an act which is itself not criminal. 12 7
21 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
21 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-
89 (1973). The injunction considered in Pittsburgh Press, see id. at 380, was narrowly tailored
to apply only to discriminatory advertising for nonexempt employment positions. Id. at 388-
89.
23, The less restrictive alternatives analysis is similarly useful, but not dispositive, in
assessing local ordinances that forbid the use of "For Sale," "Sold," and "Open" signs in front
of residences in order to combat the practice of blockbusting. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1976); Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). The evil
addressed by these statutes is the panic selling of homes brought on by fear of a sudden
change in the racial balance of the neighborhood. In Linmark, the court noted that the
challenged ordinance was narrowly drafted to attack this evil, as there was no restriction on
the use of signs on model homes or on the use of newspaper advertisements. 535 F.2d at 800,
802. Even if further less restrictive means are not available, see Note, Freedom of Expression
in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1196 (1965), the balance of interests in these
cases may not justify this form of content regulation. The ordinance may illegitimately
impede the efforts of minority group members to buy homes if alternative sources of informa-
tion about houses for sale-newspaper ads, for instance-are unavailable to members of
minority groups because the realtors who control most of this advertising prefer white custom-
ers to minority customers. Moreover, the justification for the ordinance is similar to the
justification for prohibiting drug price advertising disapproved by the Court in Virginia Board
of Pharmacy, in that the Township is arguing for "the advantages of [its citizens] being kept
in ignorance." 96 S. Ct. at 1829. Given the Court's suspicion of these paternalistic justifica-
tions, the balance of interests in the blockbusting context may weigh in favor of free speech.
m 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
2u Ordinances of the City of Detroit § 39-1-52, cited in 389 F. Supp. at 926. The accosting
and soliciting section provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to accost, solicit or invite another in any public place
or in or from any building or vehicle by word, gesture or any other means to commit or
afford an opportunity to commit fornication or prostitution or to do any other lewd
immoral act. It shall be unlawful for any male person to engage or offer to engage the
services of a female person for the purposes of prostitution, lewdness or assignation, by
the payment in money or other forms of consideration.
217 389 F. Supp. at 926.
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The court held that soliciting prostitution or fornication is commer-
cial speech without socially redeeming value and could be prohib-
ited under Valentine v. Chrestensen.23
Given that prostitution and fornication were legal, and assum-
ing that the solicitations were nondeceptive, the court should have
inquired whether the government's interest in preventing neighbor-
hood deterioration, the spread of prostitution, and offensive accost-
ing of uninterested persons could be served without totally prohibit-
ing the speech. An ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of lawful
sexual acts by lewd or offensive language 2 9 would be one permissible
alternative to a total ban as a means of controlling offensive
accosting.40 The government could pursue its interests in prevent-
ing neighborhood blight and the spread of prostitution by regulating
the time, place, and manner of soliciting for lawful sexual acts.241
Such regulations could prohibit solicitation for sexual purposes on
public streets and sidewalks, or by means of a loudspeaker, even
though other commercial solicitation is not so limited.2 2 If the less
restrictive alternatives analysis were seriously applied, an ordinance
that would prohibit nonoffensive advertising in all forums for lawful
sexual commerce would be unconstitutional.
2 Id. at 927.
z1 The high level of tolerance for offensive language required by the first amendment
outside the commercial context might make such a prohibition invalid. See, e.g., Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). When commercial speech is involved, however, there may be
a greater willingness to uphold restrictions on offensive speech. See Note, The Limits of
Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1527, 1536 n.40
(1975). The possibility of greater regulation of offensive (or obscene) language in the commer-
cial context was not mentioned in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), or Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). How-
ever, other Supreme Court decisions suggest that commercial promotion of erotica may be
entitled to less protection than is accorded to erotic literature itself. See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (affirming jury verdict finding advertisement for book obscene, but
the book itself nonobscene); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). One reason for
permitting more rigorous regulation of offensiveness in commercial advertising is the greater
durability of commercial speech. See text at note 178 supra.
20 For other cases dealing with offensiveness in commercial advertising, see, e.g., Hodges
v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504 (D. Neb. 1971) ("topless" dancing to promote alcoholic beverages
construed as unprotected commercial speech); State v. Cardwell, 539 P.2d 169 (Or. App.
1975) (statute prohibiting use of nudity or sex for advertising purposes unconstitutional
despite commercial speech context).
244 The Court has indicated that sexually explicit speech is subject to more rigorous time,
place, and manner regulation than speech containing a "social, political, or philosophical
message." Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2452 (1976).
242 This exception to the general rule forbidding selective exclusion from a public forum,
see Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972), is justified because of the low value of
offensive commercial speech. See text and notes at notes 187-95 supra.
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The less restrictive methods analysis does not resolve all the
questions about prohibitions of truthful advertising for lawful prod-
ucts and services. The great advantage of the technique is that it
requires courts to carefully consider the adequacy of the governmen-
tal interests asserted to justify such prohibitions.
D. Regulations of Commercial Advertising as Applied to Media
Distributors
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Virginia Board of Pharmacy
on the durability of commercial advertising is useful in considering
regulations of commercial advertising applied to the media as the
distributors of such advertising. The media are generally more vul-
nerable to the chilling effects of governmental regulation of adver-
tising because they have less financial interest than advertisers in
the distribution of any particular type of advertising2"l and lack the
advertisers' access to the facts about specific products and services.
Because of the proportionally small revenue the media derive from
any one line of advertising, they have little incentive to expend time
and resources in screening potentially deceptive or illegal ads. More-
over, the potential loss to the media is quite large if they can be held
responsible for the content of the advertising they distribute-
particularly if they can be held liable for damages or can be made
subject to an injunction barring the distribution of an entire publi-
cation or broadcast.21" To avoid potentially serious chilling effects,
the media should not be subject to criminal penalties, damages,
or injunctive relief for the dissemination of particular advertising
absent a showing of at least negligence in distributing the offending
advertisement.2 15
241 See text and notes at notes 115-16 supra.
"4 See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). In overturning an adminis-
trative determination that a magazine publisher had disseminated advertising providing
information as to where obscene material could be obtained, Justice Harlan stated:
[Tihe power of the Post Office to bar a magazine from the mails, if exercised without
proof of the publisher's knowledge of the character of the advertisements included in the
magazine, would as effectively "impose a severe limitation on the public's access to
constitutionally protected matter," . . . as would a state obscenity statute which makes
criminal the possession of obscene material without proof of scienter. Since publishers
cannot practicably be expected to investigate each of their advertisers, and since the
economic consequences of an order barring even a single issue of a periodical from the
mails might entail heavy financial sacrifice, a magazine publisher might refrain from
accepting advertisements from those whose own materials could conceivably be deemed
objectionable by the Post Office Department.
Id. at 493.
I' If the only remedy available against the media were a cease and desist order, the
1976]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Superior access to the facts about an advertised product is im-
portant in determining the proper standard of protection for media
distributors when disputes over these facts are involved in applying
advertising regulations.24 Access to facts becomes crucial in apply-
ing regulations of false or deceptive advertising or prohibitions of
advertising for a product defined in terms of a quantitative variable,
such as all beverages containing more than a specified percentage
of alcohol. When the applicability of advertising regulations turns
on questions of fact about a product that cannot be answered by
examining the advertisement itself, more than a demonstration of
negligence is required.247 The media, if they have no actual knowl-
edge of the inculpatory facts about a product, should not be held
liable for disseminating the advertisement even though an indepen-
dent investigation of the product would reveal that it falls within
the terms of the regulation. 48 To impose liability in this context on
chilling effect would be negligible and the media could be subjected to such an order without
a demonstration of fault.
216 The Court has emphasized superior access to facts in varying the standard of protec-
tion of speech in the context of labor relations. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 617-20 (1969), where the Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a labor statute forbid-
ding employers to use threats of "reprisal or force or promise of benefit" during union organi-
zation drives, noting "an employer, who has control over [the employer-employee] relation-
ship and therefore knows it best, cannot be heard to complain that he is without an adequate
guide for his behavior. . . .At the least he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding
conscious overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employees." Id. at 620.
24? See Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974) (magazine publisher held not liable for printing advertisement for fireworks that had
injured plaintiffs who had purchased them in response to the advertisement). But cf. Blinick
v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. City Ct.
1971), appeal dismissed, 71 Misc. 2d 986, 337 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1972). In this case a
newspaper was held liable for printing the wrong telephone number in an advertisement that
on its face encouraged obscene calls. The incorrect number was apparently given the newspa-
per by the advertiser, but the publisher failed to check the number by calling it-"the work
of only a minute or so." Unusual procedural aspects make the case suspect. See generally
Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 686 (1950).
A publisher may have the duty to investigate the products it advertises if it endorses the
products. See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). See
generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 181 (1971).
,4' [N]o such legal duty rests upon [a publisher of advertisements] unless it un-
dertakes to guarantee, warrant or endorse the product. To impose the suggested broad
legal duty upon publishers of nationally circulated magazines, newspapers and other
publications, would not only be impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering
adverse effect on the commercial world and our economic system. For the law to permit
such exposure to those in the publishing business who in good faith accept paid adver-
tisements for a myriad of products would open the doors "to a liability in an indetermi-
nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (Ct. App. 1931).
Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 209-10, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974).
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a showing of mere negligence could deter the media from distribut-
ing any advertising related to the product, thereby depriving the
public of a valuable source of commercial information. 29 The re-
quirement of actual knowledge, which the Supreme Court has ap-
proved for prohibitions of media distribution of advertising for ob-
scene material,'50 should assure that the flow of legitimate commer-
cial information is not impeded by regulations of media distribution
of advertising. Actual knowledge should not be required, however,
when the information available to the media from the face of the
advertisement would indicate to a reasonable person that the adver-
tisement violates a regulation.21 For example, when the advertising
of "cigarettes 252 or "contraceptives"25 3 is prohibited, the media will
generally have access to all the information they need to keep within
the clear bounds of the regulation.
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that after Bigelow and Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, the constitutionality of regulations of commer-
cial speech should be assessed in the manner first suggested in
Pittsburgh Press. Under this approach, courts should determine
whether the speech at issue is commercial speech, then apply either
the balancing test associated with commercial speech or the stand-
ard of strict scrutiny employed in measuring speech regulations
outside the commercial speech context. In making this inquiry, the
courts should adopt a definition of commercial speech based upon
211 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (the Court reserved judgment
on the question whether in future libel actions by private individuals a higher degree of fault,
perhaps actual malice, would be required "if a State purported to condition civil liability on
a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broad-
caster of its defamatory potential"); State v. Beacon Publishing Co., 141 Kan. 734, 738-39,
42 P.2d 960, 964 (1935) (the court, in upholding the constitutionality of the state "printer's
ink" statute as applied to a publisher, emphasized that under the statute a publisher must
knowingly print false advertisement in order to be liable).
2' Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 491-95 (1962); see Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
' See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972):
[A] publisher can readily determine from the face of an advertisement whether it is
intended to express a discriminatory preference. However the languge of the advertise-
ment is couched, the purpose of an advertiser who wishes to publish an advertisement
in violation of the Act is to communicate his intent to discriminate and a publisher can
divine this intent as well as any of his readers.
2"2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1335 (1970).
' See N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972).
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the reduced first amendment value that the Supreme Court has
identified as characteristic of commercial advertising. The proposed
definition reflects this lower order of value and the greater durabil-
ity of commercial advertising: commercial speech is speech referring
to a brand name product or service that is not itself protected by
the first amendment, issued by a speaker with a financial interest
in the sale of the product or service or in the distribution of the
speech.
Where the speech involved is within the terms of this definition,
courts should review regulations under a balancing test that re-
quires the governmental interests supporting the regulation to out-
weigh the first amendment value of the speech. In applying this
balancing test, courts should consider such factors as whether the
speech involved is false or deceptive, whether the regulation singles
out advertising with particular content for special treatment,
whether the activity advertised is itself illegal, and whether the
speaker's incentives to advertise and his access to information about
the item advertised make his speech more resistant to the chilling
effects of regulation.
This comment has suggested that a showing of significant gov-
ernmental interests should be required to sustain total prohibitions
of truthful advertising for lawful products and services. Valid com-
munity interests in controlling the consumption of undesirable com-
mercial products will not be frustrated by this requirement. As the
court of appeals observed in Chrestensen v. Valentine,254 even if
complete suppression of advertising for a particular product is un-
warranted, less restrictive methods of regulating commercial adver-
tising may be available to vindicate the government's interests. The
Supreme Court's ill-considered ruling in Chrestensen obscured this
insight, but three decades later the Court has seen its wisdom.
Thomas W. Merrill
zA 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Second Circuit observed:
Absolute prohibition of expression "in the marketplace" is illegal, not to be saved by
any commercial taint attached to the expression; reasonable regulation of soliciting, not
preventing freedom of expression, is permissible. And in the latter case, where the
soliciting is for profit, steps to identify, even to license, the soliciter may be upheld to
prevent fraud upon or inconvenience to the public. (Note that this distinction between
forms of solicitation may be made clear, definite, and workable, since it has a common-
sense purpose in mind and deals with regulation, not prohibition. .. .
Id. at 515.
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